Essays on Operational Flexibilities in Production Planning under Supply and Quality Uncertainty by Noparumpa, Tim
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Business Administration - Dissertations Whitman School of Management 
8-2012 
Essays on Operational Flexibilities in Production Planning under 
Supply and Quality Uncertainty 
Tim Noparumpa 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/busad_etd 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Noparumpa, Tim, "Essays on Operational Flexibilities in Production Planning under Supply and Quality 
Uncertainty" (2012). Business Administration - Dissertations. 92. 
https://surface.syr.edu/busad_etd/92 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Whitman School of Management at SURFACE. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITIES IN PRODUCTION PLANNING 
UNDER SUPPLY AND QUALITY UNCERTAINTY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the use of operational flexibilities in production 
planning in order to mitigate the negative effects of supply and quality uncertainty. 
Uncertainties in supply and quality are commonly experienced among agro-businesses, 
and in particular, in the wine industry. The goal of the dissertation is to provide 
prescriptive solutions in mitigating such risks from the lives of agricultural businesses. 
 
The first essay of the dissertation examines the impact of supply and quality 
uncertainty on the investment decisions made by winemakers who lease vineyard space 
to grow their own fruit. At the end of the growing season, the winemaker receives an 
uncertain amount of high- and low-quality grapes, due to varying growing conditions 
such as adverse weather conditions, diseases and natural disasters. High-quality grapes 
are used in the making of a high-end (reserve) wine, and low-quality grapes are used for 
the production of a low-end wine. In this study, we investigate the benefits of the 
downward substitution flexibility, where the winemaker uses its excess high-quality 
grapes for the production of its low-end wine. In addition, we examine the influence of, 
and the interrelationships between, three forms of operational flexibilities: downward 
substitution, price-setting, and fruit trading flexibilities.  
 
 
 
The second essay of the dissertation investigates the use of advance selling to 
mitigate quality risk in wine production. This essay examines the influence of quality 
uncertainty on winemakers’ decisions regarding the allocation of its wine for retail 
operations. Specifically, we study what proportion of the wine should be sold through 
regular distribution channels versus what proportion should be sold as “wine futures” in 
advance of bottling. Due to the intricacies of the production method, the quality of wine 
may vary from the moment aging begins in the barrel to the time it is bottled and sold to 
the general public. This study examines the use of wine futures, whereby a winemaker 
sells its wine while it is still in the barrel in order to reduce the quality rating risk at the 
time of distribution. Overall, wine futures not only allow the winemaker to pass on the 
quality rating risk established through expert tastings to consumers but also let them 
bring in cash for immediate reinvestment into the next vintage. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, we study the use of operational flexibilities to mitigate the 
negative effects of supply and quality uncertainty that are commonly experienced among 
agro-businesses, and in particular, in the wine industry.  
In the United States, the wine industry accounts for 8.4% of world wine production 
making the U.S. fourth largest wine producer in the world.1 While the ‘art of 
winemaking’ in the ‘new world’ has been refined to the point that rivaled that of the more 
established ‘old world’ wineries in France, winemakers still face factors that are beyond 
their control such as: natural disasters, variations in the climate, and diseases.  
This dissertation finds motivation from local wineries in the state of New York. The 
Finger Lakes region of upstate New York represents one of the fastest growing 
winemaking appellations in the United States and ranks second only to California in 
terms of wine production.2 In recent years, the popularity of wine from this region has 
increased dramatically due to the exposure it has received from the national media 
resulting from the high-quality wine that are being produced. One of the most popular 
wines in this region is the Pinot Noir Barrel Reserve by Heart and Hands Wine Company. 
While many critics believed that Pinot Noir grapes are too vulnerable in the harsh winters 
of the upstate New York, Heart and Hands Wine Company has managed to overcome this 
skepticism, and has produced a high-quality Pinot Noir wine that received many positive 
                                                 
1 Wine America – The National Association of American Wineries, reported that from July 2006 to June 
2007, 661,288,503 gallons of wine was produced in the US, making US the fourth largest wine 
producing country behind, Italy, France and Spain.  
2 Wine America – The National Association of American Wineries, reported that from July 2006 to June 
2007, California produced 589,632,004 gallons of wine, New York produced 28,551,434 gallons of wine 
and Washington produced 20,264,144 gallons of wine (Data from U.S. Tax and Trade Bureau). 
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accolades from influential wine critics, such as Eric Asimov of The New York Times. 
Heart and Hands Wine Company has been able to produce excellent wines due to its 
winemaking skills. We develop mathematical models to assist Heart and Hands Wine 
Company and other winemakers to succeed in business, and help them grow in a healthy 
and steady manner. These models are intended to help winemakers make challenging 
production decisions while facing uncertainty in supply and quality.   
This dissertation presents two essays that examine the use of supply chain 
managements tools and techniques to assist winemakers in making decisions under 
various forms of uncertainty. The first essay of this dissertation investigates the use of 
operational flexibilities to reduce the effect of supply and quality uncertainty. The second 
essay of this dissertation considers the use of advance selling in the form of wine futures 
that can be used to reduce quality risks, while maximizing revenue from wine production 
and sales.  
1.1 Overview of Essay 1 
This essay examines the interrelationships among three forms of operational 
flexibilities—downward substitution, price setting, and fruit trading—that are valuable to 
an agricultural firm, specifically to a winemaker, operating under supply and quality 
uncertainty. The firm initially leases farm space (i.e., vineyard) in order to grow its fruit 
(i.e., grapes) before the harvest season begins. At the end of the harvesting season, the 
firm obtains two grades of a fruit that are used in making two different end products of 
differing quality sold to two customer segments. High-quality fruit is used in making a 
high-end wine (typically referred to as premium or reserve wines) and low-quality fruit is 
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used in making a low-end wine. The high-grade fruit is downward substitutable—it can 
be used in the production of the low-quality end product. 
This study makes three sets of contributions to the field of supply chain planning 
under random supply and quality. First, it shows the interrelationships between the 
above-mentioned three forms of operational flexibilities. Contradicting the common 
notion, we show that pricing flexibility plays a complementary role to downward-
substitution flexibility, increasing its utilization beyond the levels of exogenous price 
models. Second, the study characterizes the impact of these flexibilities on the firm’s 
vineyard lease. The addition of fruit-trading flexibility reduces the amount of vineyard 
lease, however, the complementary behavior of pricing and downward substitution can 
create an incentive for a higher initial investment. Third, the essay demonstrates the 
influence of the variation in supply and quality and their correlation on the amount of 
vineyard lease, expected profit, expected amount and probability of downward 
substitution. For example, variation in quality does not influence the probability of fruit 
trading. The firm benefits most from downward substitution in the presence of limited 
supply variation and significant quality variation.  
1.2 Overview of Essay 2 
This essay examines the use of wine futures and advance selling as a form of 
operational flexibility to mitigate quality rating risk in wine production. At the end of a 
harvest season, the winemaker obtains a certain number of barrels of wine that can be 
produced for a particular vintage. Fine wine is generally aged in barrels for two years; 
during this aging period, the quality of wine can fluctuate depending on the quality of 
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grapes, the skills of the winemaker, the process used in wine making, and the aging 
conditions. After the first year of aging, expert reviewers (e.g., Robert Parker Jr., James 
Suckling, Eric Asimov) are invited to taste the wine while still in barrel. These experts 
generate the barrel rating for the wine. The barrel rating score provides an indication 
about the potential quality of this wine, and offers clues regarding whether it would be a 
success or a failure. At this point the winemaker must make two decisions: the percentage 
of its wine to be sold as futures and the price of wine futures. After one more year of 
aging, the wine is bottled, and the reviewers provide another review of the wine, and 
assign a bottle rating that influences the market price of the wine.  
Advance selling in the form of wine futures offers several benefits to the winemaker. 
It enables the firm to pass on the risk of holding inventory that is uncertain in value to the 
consumers. It also allows the firm to recuperate the monetary investment early in the 
production process. Advance selling comes with risks as well. If the bottle score 
appreciates beyond the barrel rating, the winemaker might lose the opportunity of 
collecting greater revenues and obtaining a higher overall profit in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2:  PRODUCTION PLANNING UNDER SUPPLY AND QUALITY UNCERTAINTY 
WITH TWO CUSTOMERS SEGMENTS AND DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION 
2.1 Introduction 
This essay investigates the interactions between three forms of operational 
flexibility—downward-substitution, price-setting and fruit-trading flexibilities—for an 
agricultural firm that faces supply and quality uncertainty. Our work finds motivation 
from a boutique winery located in the State of New York, and is gaining popularity for its 
Pinot Noir wines among wine connoisseurs. The firm leases vineyard in order to grow its 
fruit. Leasing farm space is common among agricultural businesses (see Kazaz 2004, 
Şaşmaz and Bilgiç 2010, Kazaz and Webster 2011), particularly among wine producers. 
Unlike owning the land, leasing farm space is economical for an agro-business because it 
requires a smaller initial capital investment. As explained by an executive at one of the 
largest wine producers (and distributors) in the world, leasing farm space reduces the 
potential negative effects of supply and quality problems on the financial performance of 
the business. For example, when the firm obtains a smaller amount of crop, or 
experiences quality problems in its grapes, its return on equity is less affected. Thus, 
leasing farm space is less risky for the operating environment of the wine producer. 
We investigate the impact of quality uncertainty, which along with supply 
uncertainty, is one of the most common challenges faced by a winemaker. Specifically, 
we examine the decisions made by the winemaker who obtains two grades of fruit crops 
(grapes) at the end of a growing season: high-quality fruit and low-quality fruit. The 
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amount of these two grades of crops is uncertain for two reasons. First, supply 
uncertainty influences the overall amount of crop obtained, i.e., the sum of high-quality 
and low-quality crops is not known prior to the growing season. Second, quality 
uncertainty changes the proportion of high-quality vs. low-quality grades of fruit in the 
amount of total grape supply. Thus, we formulate the problem using two random 
variables: one variable represents the randomness in supply, corresponding to the random 
yield of the total crop, and another random variable represents the randomness in the 
proportion of high-quality versus low-quality grapes. We make no assumptions regarding 
the distribution of these two random variables. Moreover, we do not require these two 
random variables to be independent, and allow them to be correlated in our model. 
Quality uncertainty in the fruit supply creates a natural segmentation for the wine 
producer. At the beginning of each growing season, this firm leases vineyard to grow its 
grapes; for the winemaker motivating our problem, this would be Pinot Noir grapes. At 
the end of the growing season, the firm obtains two grades of fruit: high-quality and low-
quality grapes. The winemaker then produces two different types of end-product (wine). 
A premium wine is produced by using solely high-quality grapes, and is marketed 
towards a customer segment with a higher willingness to pay. We refer to this customer 
segment as the high-end market segment. One key characteristic of this market segment 
is that the price-elasticity of the demand function is significantly lower.3 A regular wine is 
produced for the general public, populated with similar products with a lower selling 
                                                 
3 Several factors contribute to the creation of high-end segment that has consumers with low price elasticity 
for this winery: recent wins at several blind-tasting competitions nationwide, a CBS Morning Show 
coverage for its outstanding Pinot Noir, a positive review from the second-most influential critic, Eric 
Asimov of the New York Times, and a book entitled “Summer in Glass” by Dawson (2011).    
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price. We describe these consumers as the low-end market segment. The regular wine for 
the low-end market is generally produced by using low-quality grapes.  
Our study investigates the influence of and the interrelationship between the 
following three forms of flexibilities that are present in the life of a winemaker: 
1. Downward substitution flexibility: The firm can use some of its high-quality 
grapes in the making of the low-end wine. The main emphasis of the essay is the 
use of downward substitution, and therefore, the study focuses on identifying the 
conditions under which the firm benefits from this flexibility. In the analysis, we 
report on the expected amount of high-quality crops used for the making of low-
end product as well as the probability of downward substitution. 
2. Pricing flexibility: The high-end customer segment exhibits a low price-elasticity 
in its demand function, and the firm determines its selling price for its premium 
wine sold in the high-end customer segment. Reserve wines are generally 
considered as premium products as they have unique tastes. For the high-end 
products such as reserve wines, winemakers can influence the demand by 
appropriately choosing the selling price. The firm does not have the same price-
setting flexibility for its regular wine targeted for the low-end market segment, 
which is populated with many similar products at a lower price level. We 
specifically examine the influence of the price-setting flexibility in the high-end 
segment on the downward-substitution flexibility. We compare our results from 
an endogenous price model with those developed under a model that uses 
exogenous prices. 
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3. Fruit-trading flexibility: The firm can purchase additional fruit from the open 
market, or sell its excess fruit in the open market. This implies that, in the event of 
low crop realizations, the firm can obtain additional high-quality and low-quality 
grapes from other growers. Alternatively, in the event of excess fruit supply, the 
firm can sell its high-quality and low-quality grapes in the open market.4 We 
consider the influence of the fruit-trading flexibility on the firm’s downward 
substitution decisions. 
The essay makes three sets of main contributions. First, we show the interactions 
between these three forms of flexibilities. While earlier research reports that pricing and 
downward-substitution flexibilities play a substitutable role, our study proves that these 
two flexibilities show a complementary behavior. Pricing encourages the firm to 
downward substitute a greater amount of its high-quality fruit and exercise it more often. 
Second, our study shows the impact of these three flexibilities on the firm’s choice of 
initial vineyard lease. While fruit-trading flexibility generally reduces the amount of 
vineyard lease, the pricing and downward substitution flexibilities can create an incentive 
for a larger initial investment. Third, the essay demonstrates the influence of the variance 
in supply and quality and the correlation between these two uncertainties on the firm’s 
initial vineyard lease investment, expected profits, expected amount and probability of 
downward substitution. We show that variation in quality does not influence the 
                                                 
4 Participating wineries help establish the fruit-trading costs through the support of the Cornell University 
Cooperative Extension prior to the growing season. For example, the 2010 fruit trading costs for popular 
grapes are established as follows: High-quality Riesling grapes can be purchased at $1900/ton, sold at 
$1100/ton, whereas low-quality Riesling grapes can be purchased at $1500/ton and sold at $700/ton; high-
quality Chardonnay grapes can be purchased at $1450/ton, sold at $1050/ton, and low-quality Chardonnay 
grapes can be purchased at $1200/ton, and sold at $900/ton; high-quality Cabernet Franc grapes can be 
purchased at $1500/ton, sold at $800/ton, and low-quality Cabernet Franc grapes can be purchased at 
$1200/ton, and sold at $750/ton . 
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probability of fruit trading, and that the firm benefits more from downward substitution 
under significant variation in quality and limited variation in supply. 
The essay is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a literature review. Section 2.3 
introduces the model. Section 2.4 examines the relationship between the downward 
substitution and fruit-trading flexibilities with exogenous prices in both market segments. 
Section 2.5 demonstrates the influence of the price-setting flexibility. Section 2.6 shows 
the impact of the three forms of operational flexibilities on vineyard lease. Section 2.7 
demonstrates the influence of quality and supply uncertainty and their correlation using 
numerical illustrations. Section 2.8 compares our model with price-setting in the high-end 
segment to previous literature that allows for price-setting in both segments. Section 2.9 
provides conclusions. All proofs are derivations are presented in the Appendix in Section 
2.10. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Earlier research in the area of production planning has given particular interest to 
solving the optimal production problem under supply uncertainty. Yano and Lee (1995) 
provide an extensive review on lot sizing problem with random yield. Gerchak et al. 
(1988) and Henig and Gerchak (1990) consider a periodic review production model with 
random yield and demand. They provide a detailed analysis of a single-period problem 
and show that the optimal production policy is not affected by yield variability.  
In addition to the above publications, many studies have focused on the notion of 
using pricing and production recourse to mitigate supply and demand uncertainty. Van 
Mieghem and Dada (1999), Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Dana and Petruzzi (2001), 
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Federgruen and Heching (1999, 2002) and Kocabıyıkoğlu and Popescu (2011) show that 
the producer uses production and pricing decisions to mitigate demand risk under 
deterministic supply. Furthermore, Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) demonstrate that, 
under postponed pricing, production postponement has little benefits to the producer.  
While many have studied the price-setting problem under demand uncertainty, few 
have investigated the problem under supply uncertainty. Li and Zheng (2006) is the first 
to consider the price-setting problem under supply uncertainty. They investigate a single-
product periodic-review model, where price is set at the beginning of each period, and 
excess demand is not lost, but backlogged. Tang and Yin (2007) also examine a firm’s 
pricing decisions under supply uncertainty, but limit the analysis to a linear demand 
function in a single market and a discrete uniform distribution representing random 
supply. Our study departs from these two studies in four ways: (1) our model features co-
production that leads to the making of two different end-products and market 
segmentation; (2) we incorporate quality uncertainty and emphasize downward 
substitution; (3) unlike the backlogged demand feature of Li and Zheng (2006), our 
formulation considers lost sales; and (4) we do not make restrictive assumptions 
regarding the demand function and distribution of uncertainty in our technical 
derivations. Moreover, we limit the firm’s ability to set price in one segment alone in 
order to reflect the real-world scenario of limited number of consumers with low price 
elasticity.  
In recent times, there has been an emergence of research that considers the option of 
utilizing a secondary source of supply that allows the firm to adjust its production level. 
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Jones et al. (2001) investigate the production planning decisions for the hybrid seed corn 
production under random yield and demand; they allow the firm to use an external supply 
source after the yield is realized. Kazaz (2004) extends this work by incorporating a 
yield-dependent cost and selling price in the olive oil industry. Kazaz and Webster (2011) 
incorporate the price-setting and the fruit-trading flexibilities under a yield-dependent 
cost structure. Our essay departs from these studies as it features: (1) a co-production 
system that leads to market segmentation, (2) quality uncertainty, and (3) downward 
substitution. 
There is a considerable amount of studies that investigate co-production systems. 
Bitran and Dasu (1992) investigate the ordering policies for multiple items with 
stochastic yield and substitutable demand using a dynamic programming formulation. 
Bitran and Gilbert (1994) extend this work by considering the production decisions in the 
semiconductor industry, and provide several practical heuristics with conditions for 
downward substitution decisions. Nahmias and Moinzadeh (1997) also investigate the 
problem of downward substitution of randomly-graded yield by formulating a continuous 
review EOQ-type model. Bassok et al. (1999) consider the production planning problem 
under downward-substitutable random demand in a single period. Their study shows that 
a greedy allocation policy is optimal, and demonstrates the conditions under which 
downward substitution is beneficial. Hsu and Bassok (1999) examine a similar problem 
by incorporating random yield. Their study shows that optimal solutions can be achieved 
by using several methods, and, computationally, the greedy algorithm is the most 
efficient solution approach. One main characteristic that is common among these works 
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in the area of co-production is that prices are exogenous. Moreover, they ignore the 
influence of a secondary source of supply. 
Other studies in the area of co-production include the work of Gerchak et al. (1996), 
which investigates a parallel production process, where one process produces randomly-
graded yield, while the other produces only low-grade yield. Ӧner and Bilgiç (2008) 
consider products that cannot be substituted, but extend the economic lot scheduling 
model to include uncontrolled co-production. Motivated from the beef industry, 
Boyabatli et al. (2011), study the procurement problem with fixed proportions 
technology, i.e., the proportion of high-quality vs. low-quality output is fixed. They 
characterize optimal sourcing strategies based on long-term contracts and procuring from 
the spot market. Boyabatli (2011) extends this study on fixed proportions technology and 
investigates the procurement problem with multiple quantity- flexible contracts, 
demonstrating the benefits of dual sourcing. This essay differs from these papers as it 
features pricing flexibility and random proportions.   
Beyond the realm of exogenous price, Bish and Wang (2004) investigate the joint 
quantity and price-setting problem under perfect supply and uncertain demand for two 
products, and show that the firm can benefit from investment in flexible resources. The 
closest match for our study is Tomlin and Wang (2008) who also examine the pricing and 
operational recourse in a co-production system. They show that the producer benefits 
more from adopting recourse pricing policy, i.e., delaying the pricing decision until after 
all uncertainty is realized, than from adopting a downward substitution policy. Our 
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current work studies a similar problem to Tomlin and Wang (2008), but differs from their 
work in the following ways:  
1. We study a production planning problem with co-production that allows for the 
utilization of the open market. We also investigate the impact of trading 
flexibilities on the optimal investment, downward substitution, and pricing 
decisions; 
2. Our work resembles the real-world scenario that the firm has the ability to set the 
selling price only in the high-end segment of the market as the consumers tend to 
be less sensitive to changes in price.  
3. Tomlin and Wang (2008) examine only the influence of quality uncertainty, 
whereas our study investigates the influence both supply and quality uncertainty, 
and shows the influence of both supply and quality variation on the optimal 
downward substitution and fruit trading decisions.  
4. We do not consider the problem of demand uncertainty as it has been shown in 
Tomlin and Wang (2008) that pricing and operational recourse dominate advance 
pricing and allocation decisions.  
2.3 Problem Definition and the Model 
This section presents the modeling approach used in the agricultural firm that experiences 
supply and quality uncertainty, and produces two different products to serve its two 
customer segments. The problem is formulated as a two-stage stochastic program. In the 
first stage, corresponding to the growing season, the firm determines the amount of farm 
space to be leased, denoted Q, at a unit cost of cl in order to maximize expected profit in 
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the presence of supply and quality uncertainty. At the end of the growing season, the firm 
realizes two grades of fruit influenced by two separate random variables. Randomness in 
the total crop supply is represented with a stochastically proportional random variable u , 
and its realization is denoted with u defined on a support [ul, uh]. Randomness in quality 
refers to the proportion of high-grade versus low-grade fruit obtained from the leased 
farm space, and is described by a stochastically proportional variable  defined on a 
support [αl, αh], where α is the realized proportion of the high- uality fruit crop and (1    
α) is the proportion of low-quality fruit crop. Our model allows for correlation to exist 
between the supply and quality random variables as they follow a joint probability 
density function (pdf) g(u, α) and a cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(u, α). Thus, 
the first-stage objective function can be written as follows: 
    
0
max , ,l
Q
E Q c Q E PA Q u 

                                                       (2.1) 
where PA(Q, u ,α) is the optimal profit from the second stage given realizations u and α.  
At the end of the first stage (growing season), the firm collects two grades of fruit 
supply; the realized amount of high-quality fruit crop is Quα and the realized amount of 
low-quality fruit crop is Qu(1    α). Quality uncertainty creates this natural market 
segmentation for the winemaker where the firm produces two versions of the final 
product in order to serve two customer segments classified as high-end and low-end 
segments. A premium wine is produced from higher quality grapes, targeting a high-end 
customer segment that is less sensitive to the selling price. A regular wine is produced 
from the low-quality grapes, targeting a more price-sensitive low-end market segment. 
The pressing cost of high-quality fruit to obtain premium wine is defined as cpH and the 
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pressing cost of low-quality fruit to make regular wine as cpL. 
At the beginning of the second stage, the winemaker makes five sets of decisions: the 
optimal values of (1) the selling price of high-quality final product pH, (2) the amount 
fruit crop (realized supply of high- and low-quality fruit supply) to be used in the 
production of high- and low-quality final products, denoted qIH and qIL, respectively, (3) 
the amount of additional high- and low-quality fruit to be purchased from other growers 
in the open market denoted qBH and qBL, at unit costs of bH and bL, respectively, (4) the 
amount of high- and low-quality fruit supply to be sold in the open market without being 
converted to the final product denoted qSH and qSL¸at unit selling prices of sH and sL, 
respectively, and (5) the amount of high-quality fruit to be downward substituted for the 
production of low-end product, denoted w. It is important to note that the values of bH, sH, 
bL and sL are available to the firm prior to the growing season (see footnote 2). Due to the 
differences in fruit quality, we have sH > sL and bH > bL. In addition, bH > sH, and bL > sL, 
which reflects the fact that the firm cannot make profit from buying the fruit in the open 
market and immediately selling it in the same market (i.e., no arbitrage). As a 
consequence of the inequalities in open market buying and selling prices, we have the 
following constraints: 
qIH + qSH + w = Quα,           (2.2) 
                               qIL + qSL  = Qu(1    α).           (2.3) 
Constraint (2.2) states that realized high-quality fruit yield is  allocated among internal 
production, open market selling, and downward substitution (i.e., it is never more 
profitable to simply discard fruit rather than selling in the open market, and it is never 
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profitable to buy high-quality fruit for the purposes of downward substitution). Similarly, 
constraint (2.3) states that realized low-quality fruit yield is allocated among internal 
production and open market selling. 
The demand in each customer segment is represented by DH(pH) and DL, respectively. 
In the high-end customer segment, we assume that the demand is price-sensitive, and is 
decreasing in pH. We denote the inverse of demand function pH(DH), and assume that the 
revenue function in the high-end customer segment (i.e., pH(DH)DH)) is concave, i.e., 
2pH'(DH) + pH''(DH)DH ≤ 0. 
The second-stage problem can be described as maximizing profit from the production 
and sale of the two end products for a given realization of high- and low-quality fruit, 
Quα and Qu(1 – α), respectively.   
  PA(Q, u, )   =
    
 
  
 
, , , ,
, , , 0
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





 

       
 
         
.    (2.4) 
We develop and analyze eleven variants of the problem in order to identify the 
interactions among the three forms of flexibility. We make the following assumption 
regarding profit margins. 
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A1: The firm makes profit from buying low-quality fruit, converting it into final product, 
and selling the final product, i.e., pL    cpL    bL > 0. Similarly, for models in which the 
high-end price is exogenous, pH    cpH    bH > 0. 
Table 2.1 provides the list of flexibilities included in each of these eleven models. 
 
Flexibility \ Model M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 
Downward substitution  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Fruit trading   ● ●   ● ●   ● 
Pricing in high-end     ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Pricing in low-end         ● ● ● 
Table 2.1. Flexibilities included in each of the eleven model variants. 
 
M1 does not feature any of the three flexibilities, and M8 is the model described in 
(2.1) – (2.4). M2 and M4 feature the downward substitution flexibility under exogenous 
prices, and M6 and M8 under the pricing flexibility in the high-end segment. M3 and M4 
feature the fruit-trading flexibility under exogenous prices, and M7 and M8 under the 
pricing flexibility in the high-end segment. M9, M10 and M11 are developed in Section 
2.8 in order to provide a comparison of the pricing flexibility present only in the high-end 
segment, representing the life of a winemaker, with the hypothetical scenario when the 
firm can set prices in both segments; M10 corresponds to the model of Tomlin and Wang 
(2008).  
Before proceeding with the analysis of the stochastic supply and quality problem 
presented in (2.1) – (2.4), we briefly examine the properties of the problem with 
deterministic supply and quality. In the deterministic variant of the problem, we replace 
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the supply random variable u  with its mean u  and the quality random variable  with 
its mean  . The firm leases Q units of farm space, and realizes high-quality crop yield of 
Qu and low-quality crop yield of (1 )Qu  . Eliminating the trading and downward 
substitution flexibilities, i.e., qBH = qSH = qBL = qSL = w = 0, the firm converts its entire 
crop to the final products. Assuming no demand restriction in the low-end segment, the 
selling price in the high-end clears the production, i.e., Qu = qIH  = DH(pH), and the firm 
converts its entire crop of the low-quality fruit to the low-end product to be sold in the 
low-end segment, i.e., (1 )Qu   = qIL = DL. Appendix B provides derivations for the 
optimal amount of farm space to be leased and the corresponding profit under 
deterministic supply and quality. The analysis leads to the following observations: (1) 
Expected profit under stochastic supply and quality is less than that of the deterministic 
supply and quality; (2) Closed-form expressions can be provided when a demand 
function is defined. When demand in each market segment is linear, for example, the 
optimal amount of farm space and the corresponding profit under stochastic supply and 
quality decreases in the coefficient of variation, denoted cv[uα].  
Under deterministic supply and quality, the firm engages in the lease opportunity only 
when the unit leasing cost is less than the expected fruit purchasing cost. 
Remark 2.1. a) If the unit cost of leasing is greater than or equal to the expected buying 
cost of high and low-quality fruit from other growers, i.e.,    1l H Lc b E u b E u      , 
then the firm relies solely on fruit purchasing and does not lease vineyard space (Q
*
 = 0). 
b) If the unit cost of leasing is smaller than or equal to the expected fruit selling revenue 
in the open market, i.e.,    1l H Lc s E u s E u      , then the firm leases as much as it 
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can because the optimal value of Q
*
 approaches infinity. c) If 
       1 1H L l H Ls E u s E u c b E u b E u               , then Q
*
 > 0 and is finite. 
Under stochastic supply and quality, however, the firm can invest in vineyard lease 
even if the expected cost of buying fruit is less than the unit cost of leasing. We next 
proceed with the analysis of stochastic supply and quality.  
2.4 Fruit-Trading Flexibility and Downward Substitution (with Exogenous Pricing) 
In this section, we treat price in both market segments as exogenous in order to 
identify the relationship between fruit-trading and downward substitution flexibilities in 
the presence of supply and quality uncertainty. This is accomplished with the comparison 
of M1 through M4.  
2.4.1 The Case of No Trading (Buying or Selling) of Fruit 
To create a benchmark for the benefits of additional flexibilities, we begin by 
investigating a classic production planning problem under supply and quality uncertainty, 
where the firm does not have the flexibility to downward substitute or trade once the fruit 
yield is realized (M1). We define the following regions of supply and quality random 
realizations for a given lease amount: 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
The firm converts its entire crop yield into the final product when the realized high- or 
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low-quality crop is less than their respective demand, i.e., when Quα ≤ DH or Qu(1    α) ≤ 
DL. This situation is represented by regions R1(Q)  and R2(Q) for the high-end fruit and 
R1(Q) and R3(Q)  for the low-end fruit. On the other hand, when the realized yield of 
high- or low-quality crop is high and is greater than the demand, i.e., Quα > DH or Qu(1    
α) > DL, the firm converts only the portion of the crop that would satisfy the demand to 
the final product; these are represented by regions R3(Q) and R4(Q)  for the high-end 
fruit and R2(Q)  and R4(Q) for the low-end fruit. 
Using the above definition of four regions of realized crop supply, the optimal 
second-stage decisions for M1 can be expressed as follows: 
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We next analyze M2, which adds downward substitution flexibility to M1. 
Downward substitution is beneficial only in region R3(Q) where the firm experiences an 
excess amount of high-quality fruit and an insufficient amount of low-quality fruit. We 
denote the shortage in the low-end as , i.e.,  
 = DL – Qu(1 – ),  
and divide region R3(Q) into the following sub-regions: 
R3a(Q) = {(u, α) : DH < Quα  DH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3b(Q) = {(u, α) : DH +  < Quα and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
Region R3a(Q) represents a situation in which the excess yield of high-quality fruit is not 
sufficient to cover the shortages of the low-end final product and thus the firm converts 
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all the excess high-quality fruit into low-end final product, i.e., w
*
 = Quα    DH. Region 
R3b(Q)  represents the scenario in which there is a high yield realization of high-quality 
crop and thus the firm converts a portion of the remaining high-quality fruit to satisfy the 
demand of low-end final product, i.e., w
*
 =  = DL    Qu(1    α). Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
uses of the high-end fruit with the boundary between R3a and R3b at (DH + )/Q. 
Using the above four regions of realized crop supply, the optimal second-stage 
decisions for M2 are:  
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.   (2.5) 
2.4.2 Incorporating Fruit-Trading Flexibility (Buying qBH ,qBL ≥ 0 and Selling qSH,  
qSL ≥ 0) 
We next incorporate the flexibility for the firm to trade fruit in the open market 
without downward substitution, as featured in M3. In this scenario, it follows from 
assumption A1 that the firm buys fruit from the open market when the realized amount of 
internally grown fruit is less than the demand, i.e., qBH
* 
= DH – Quα ≥ 0 and qBL
*
 = DL – 
Qu(1– α) =  ≥ 0. Alternatively, when the realized amount of fruit crop exceeds the 
desired demand level, then the firm sells the unused crop in the open market, i.e., qSH
*
 = 
Quα – DH  ≥ 0 and qSL
*
 = Qu(1– α) – DL = – ≥ 0. Accordingly, the optimal second-stage 
decisions for M3 are:  
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Figure 2.1. Optimal downward substitution quantity under exogenous pricing.  
 
Next, we analyze M4 where the firm has both the flexibility to downward substitute 
and trade fruit in the open market. In this model, the downward substitution option is 
only viable when savings from the utilization of high-quality fruit crop in the making of 
the low-end product outweighs the selling price of high-quality crop in the open market, 
i.e., w
*
 > 0 if and only if sH  < bL. Otherwise, downward substitution does not occur as it 
is more beneficial for the firm to sell the excess crop in the open market. It is important to 
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note that sH < bL for the winemakers motivating our study (see popular grapes prices in 
footnote 2). Therefore, to investigate the benefit from downward substitution, for the 
remainder of this essay, we assume sH  < bL. The objective function in (2.4) can be 
rewritten as: 
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Similar to the case where there is no trading option, the firm benefits from downward 
substitution when the realization of high-quality crop is high and there is an insufficient 
amount of low-quality fruit. In region R3a(Q), the excess amount of high-quality crop is 
smaller than the shortage in the low-quality fruit, and thus, the firm benefits from 
downward substitution, i.e., w
*
 = Quα − DH, and saves (bL – sH)(Quα – DH) from 
purchasing additional low-quality fruit from the open market. On the other hand, in 
region R3b(Q), the supply of high-quality crop is sufficiently high to cover the shortage 
in the low-quality fruit; specifically, w
*
 = DL − Qu(1– α)  =  with a resulting savings of 
(bL – sH). Accordingly, the optimal second-stage decisions for M4 can be expressed as 
follows: 
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It is common wisdom that the introduction of an additional form of flexibility, as in 
the form of fruit-trading flexibility, would reduce the utilization of other forms of 
flexibility (e.g., downward substitution) present in the environment (e.g., Van Mieghem 
and Dada 1999, Jones et al. 2001, Kazaz 2004, and Tomlin and Wang 2008). However, 
as shown in the following proposition, the additional flexibility to trade fruit in the open 
market does not influence the probability of downward substitution and the expected 
amount of downward substitution. Thus, in the absence of the pricing flexibility, these 
two forms of flexibility neither present a substitutable role, nor play a complementary 
role to each other.   
Proposition 2.1. In the absence of pricing flexibility, for a given Q, the probability of 
downward substitution and the expected amount of downward substitution does not 
change with the additional flexibility of fruit-trading in the open market. 
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2.5. The Combination of Downward Substitution, Pricing, and Fruit-Trading 
Flexibilities  
In this section, we develop the structural properties of M5, M6, M7 and M8, where 
the firm has the pricing flexibility in the high-end segment.  
2.5.1 Price-Setting Flexibility in the High-End Segment and Downward Substitution 
We begin our analysis by assuming that the firm does not have the ability to acquire 
or sell fruit in the open market, or downward substitute its high-quality fruit for the 
production of its low-end product, which corresponds to M5, i.e. qBH = qSH = qBL = qSL = 
w = 0. Under the price-setting flexibility in the high-end market segment, the amount of 
high-quality fruit realization influences the pricing and quantity decisions. When the 
realized amount of high-quality fruit is high, the firm has the ability to set the profit-
maximizing price and convert only the amount of fruit that corresponds to the demand at 
the profit-maximizing price. On the other hand, when the high-quality fruit realization is 
limited, the firm converts all the realized supply into the final product and sells at the 
market clearing price. In the case of low-end product, the optimal production decision 
follows our analysis of the case presented in Section 2.4.1.  
In the following proposition, we define a threshold for the production amount in the 
high-end segment. The threshold, denoted TPH, is the optimal amount of high-end 
product to produce when there is no constraint on the supply of high-quality fruit. 
Proposition 2.2. The threshold for the amount of high-end product to be produced from 
the internal resource for M5 is  * *'H H pH H HTP p c D p     . 
We use the threshold amount to define the following regions of supply and quality 
 37 
random realizations for a given lease amount and high-end selling price: 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
In regions R1(Q) and R2(Q), the firm sets the high-end price to clear the market, 
pH(Qu). In regions R3(Q) and R4(Q), the firm has excess supply of high-quality fruit 
and sets the high-end price to sell the threshold quantity. The optimal second-stage 
quantity decisions for M5 are  
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and the optimal high-end price is pH
*
 = pH(qIH
*
). 
We next investigate M6 which incorporates downward substitution in addition to the 
pricing flexibility in the high-end segment. The second-stage problem in M6 can be 
rewritten as:
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When Qu(1 – )  DL, which corresponds to regions R2(Q) and R4(Q) above, the 
low-end market has sufficient supply; there is no downward substitution and the optimal 
decisions that apply in R2(Q) and R4(Q) for M5 are also optimal for M6.  
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To consider the case of Qu(1 – ) < DL, we require a threshold quantity. Recall that 
TPH is the optimal high-end production quantity for M5 when there is no limit on high-
end supply. We similarly define a threshold production amount for M6. In particular,
D
HTP  denotes the optimal high-end production amount when high-quality fruit that is not 
used for high-end production gains unit profit pL – cPL through downward substitution. 
The threshold in the presence of downward substitution is smaller than the threshold 
without downward substitution. 
Proposition 2.3. The threshold for the amount of high-end product to be produced from 
the internal resource for M6 is     * *'DH H pH L pL H H HTP p c p c D p TP      . 
 Recall that  = DL – Qu(1 – ) is the low-end shortage amount. We replace regions 
R1(Q) and R3(Q) with the following sub-regions: 
R1a(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα  D
HTP and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R1b(Q) = {(u, α) : D
HTP < Quα 
D
HTP   and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3a(Q) = {(u, α) : D
HTP  < Quα  TPH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3b(Q) = {(u, α) : TPH +  < Quα and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
An interesting transition occurs between region R1b(Q) and R3a(Q). In region 
R1b(Q) the firm is able to produce the optimal high-end threshold quantity under 
downward substitution ( D
HTP ), then downward substitute the balance to satisfy a portion 
of the shortage in the low-end segment (). In region R3a(Q), the firm has more than 
enough to cover D
HTP  and the shortage . However, once the firm has allocated 
D
HTP  to 
high-end production and has downward substituted the quantity , the change in profit 
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associated with allocating more volume to the high end segment is positive, and thus the 
firm allocates the balance of high-quality fruit to high-end production (up to TPH; see 
Figure 2.2).5 Accordingly, the optimal second-stage quantity decisions for M6 are  
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   (2.7) 
and the optimal high-end price is pH
*
 = pH(qIH
*
). 
In order to assess the impact of pricing flexibility on downward substitution, we 
compare M6 where the firm is free to set the high-end product price with M2 where price 
is exogenous. To isolate the effect of pricing flexibility, we set the exogenous high-end 
product price to the price that maximizes the high-end product profit when the low-end is 
ignored, i.e., the exogenous high-end product price for M2 is pH = pH(TPH). The 
following proposition shows that pricing flexibility in the high-end segment leads to a 
higher probability of downward substitution and a higher expected amount of fruit 
utilized in the making of the low-end product.  
Proposition 2.4. For a given Q, the price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment 
increases the probability of downward substitution and the expected amount of fruit 
downward substituted.  
                                                 
5 This is the optimal allocation because, in the event that the total allocated to the high end is less than TPH, 
the firm would lose profit if a portion of the downward substitution amount is shifted to high-end 
production (follows from the definition of
D
HTP ). 
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Figure 2.2. Optimal downward substitution quantity under endogenous pricing.  
 
2.5.2 Price-Setting Flexibility in the High-End Segment and the Fruit-Trading 
Flexibility  
M7 features the fruit-trading flexibility in the presence of pricing flexibility in the 
high-end segment. We begin our analysis by analyzing the firm’s ability to buy and sell 
fruit in the open market independently. Similar to the exogenous model, the firm would 
benefit from buying additional fruit from the open market when the fruit supply of high- 
or low-quality crop is low. On the other hand, when the supply of the high- or low-quality 
fruit is high, the firm can use the open market to gain additional revenue from selling its 
excess fruit crop. It should be noted here that, because the firm does not set price in the 
low-end segment, the structural properties pertaining to this segment decisions remain the 
same with those developed under exogenous price. The following proposition establishes 
a threshold for selling high-quality fruit in the open market, denoted TSH , and another 
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threshold for buying high-quality fruit from the open market, denoted TBH .  
Proposition 2.5. The threshold for the amount of high-quality fruit to be sold in the open 
market is 
  * *'H H pH H H HTS p c s D p       
and the threshold for the amount of high-quality fruit to be purchased in the open market 
is 
 * *'H H pH H H H HTB p c b D p TS       . 
 When high-end fruit supply is below TBH, the firm purchases up to TBH in the open 
market. When high-end fruit supply is above TSH, the firm sells the excess in the open 
market. As noted above, the rules for open market buying and selling of low-quality fruit 
follow the rules for M3. This leads to six regions of supply and random quality random 
realizations (see Figure 2.3). 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
R5(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R6(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}. 
Accordingly, the optimal second-stage quantity decisions for M7 are 
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and the optimal high-end price is pH
*
 = pH(qIH
*
 + qBH
*
). 
Proposition 2.6. For a given Q, the price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment 
decreases the probability of fruit trading and the expected amount of fruit trading.  
 
Figure 2.3. Different regions of u, α realization under endogenous pricing and trading in 
M7 (HQ in the figure refers to high-quality fruit and LQ refers to low-quality fruit). 
 
We next compare M7 and M3. To provide a fair comparison, we set the exogenous 
price of M3 in the high-end segment to be in the interval of pH(TBH) and pH(TSH). The 
following proposition shows that the firm engages in fruit trading less frequently in the 
presence of the price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment. The result indicates that 
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price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment and the fruit-trading flexibility play a 
substitutable role in the life of a winemaker. 
2.5.3 Price-Setting in the High-End Segment, Fruit-Trading and Downward-
Substitution Flexibilities 
M8, as presented in (2.1) – (2.4), features all three flexibilities: price-setting in the 
high-end segment, fruit-trading, and downward substitution. The second-stage objective 
function in (2.4) can be rewritten as:     
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When Qu(1 – )  DL, which corresponds to regions R2(Q), R4(Q), and R6(Q) 
above, the low-end market has sufficient supply; there is no downward substitution and 
the optimal decisions that apply in R2(Q), R4(Q), and R6(Q) for M7 are also optimal for 
M8.  
To consider the case of Qu(1 – ) < DL, we require a threshold quantity. Recall that 
D
HTP  is the optimal high-end production amount when high-quality fruit that is not used 
for high-end production gains unit profit pL – cPL through downward substitution. We 
similarly define a threshold production amount for M8. In particular, DT
HTP denotes the 
optimal high-end production amount when high-quality fruit that is not used for high-end 
production saves the open market purchase cost bL through downward substitution (the 
firm prefers to downward substitute over selling high-quality fruit in the open market 
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because sH < bL). The production threshold in the presence of downward substitution 
DT
HTP is smaller than the threshold without downward substitution (TSH). 
Proposition 2.7. The threshold for the amount of high-end product to be produced from 
the internal resource for M8 is 
    * *'DTH H pH L H HTP p c b D p     < TPH,  
and  
 DT
H H H HTB TP TS TP   ,  
and 
D DT
H HTP TP . 
 Recall that  = DL – Qu(1 – ) is the low-end shortage amount. We replace regions 
R3(Q) and R5(Q) with the following sub-regions: 
R3a(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ 
DT
HTP and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3b(Q) = {(u, α) : DT
HTP < Quα ≤ 
DT
HTP  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R5a(Q) = {(u, α) : DT
HTP < Quα  TSH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R5b(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
Similar to M5, an interesting transition occurs between region R3b(Q) and R5a(Q) 
(see Figure 2.4). In region R3b(Q) the firm is able to produce the optimal high-end 
threshold quantity under downward substitution with trading flexibility ( DT
HTP ), then 
downward substitute the balance to satisfy a portion of the shortage in the low-end 
segment (). In region R5a(Q), the firm has more than enough to cover DT
HTP  and the 
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shortage . However, once the firm has allocated DT
HTP to high-end production and has 
downward substituted the quantity , the change in profit associated with allocating more 
volume to the high end is positive, and thus the firm allocates the balance of high- quality 
fruit to high-end production. Accordingly, the optimal second-stage quantity decisions for 
M8 are  
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.    (2.8) 
and the optimal high-end price is pH
*
 = pH(qIH
*
 + qBH
*
). 
We next compare M4 and M8 in order to examine the effect of the price-setting 
flexibility on the two other flexibilities. Similar to the comparison between M2 and M6, 
we fix the selling price in the high-end segment for M4 to be equal to the profit 
maximizing price pH(TPH). The following proposition shows that in the presence of fruit-
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trading flexibility, pricing flexibility in the high-end segment leads to a higher probability 
of downward substitution and a higher expected amount of fruit utilized in the making of 
the low-end product. 
Proposition 2.8. For a given Q, the price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment 
increases the probability of downward substitution and the expected amount of fruit 
downward substituted. 
Recall that when a firm does not have pricing flexibility, fruit-trading and downward-
substitution flexibilities are neither complements nor substitutes (i.e., the amount and 
likelihood of downward substitution does not change when fruit-trading flexibility is 
introduced; see Proposition 2.2.1). To assess the relationship between fruit-trading and 
downward-substitution flexibilities in the presence of pricing flexibility in the high-end 
segment, we next compare M6 and M8. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Optimal downward substitution quantity under endogenous pricing and fruit-
trading.  
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Proposition 2.9. a) For a given Q, in the presence of price-setting flexibility in the high-
end segment, the downward substitution threshold with fruit-trading flexibility is higher 
than the downward substitution threshold without fruit-trading flexibility; b) For a given 
Q, in the presence of the price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment, fruit-trading 
flexibility decreases the probability of downward substitution and the expected amount of 
fruit downward substituted. 
The above proposition shows that the winemaker benefits more from downward 
substitution in the absence of fruit-trading flexibility. Because the firm engages in 
downward substitution at an earlier realization of high-quality fruit in the absence of 
fruit-trading flexibility, it experiences a higher probability of downward substitution and 
utilizes a greater (expected) amount of grapes for downward substitution. Furthermore, 
the above proposition shows that with the presence of the price-setting flexibility, fruit-
trading and downward-substitution flexibility play a substitutable role. This result 
contradicts the earlier finding in the absence of the price-setting flexibility. Proposition 
2.1 has shown that the fruit-trading flexibility does not influence the probability of 
downward substitution and the expected amount of downward substitution in the absence 
of price-setting flexibility. However, when the price-setting flexibility is included in the 
high-end segment, Proposition 2.9 shows that fruit trading and downward substitution 
flexibilities play a substitutable role. 
Figure 2.5 provides a summary of the relationship between the three forms of 
flexibilities presented in this study. From Figure 2.5, and our analysis in this section, it is 
clear that price-setting flexibility in the high-end segment and downward substitution 
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flexibility play a complementary role with or without the fruit-trading flexibility. Our 
study proves that the winemaker benefits more by engaging in downward substitution at 
an earlier high-quality crop realization in the presence of the price-setting flexibility. In 
Section 2.8, we compare our model to a model that allows for price setting in both market 
segments, and analytically demonstrate its effect on downward substitution.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. The relationship between downward-substitution, fruit-trading and price-
setting flexibilities. 
2.5.4 The Impact of Quality and Supply Uncertainty 
This section investigates the impact of increasing variance in supply or quality 
uncertainty on the probability of downward substitution and fruit trading. We begin our 
discussion with downward substitution. Proposition 2.8 has established that price-setting 
flexibility increases the likelihood of downward substitution. In order for the firm to 
engage in downward substitution, the high-quality fruit realization has to be greater than 
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DH in models M2 and M4, TPH
D
 in M6, and TPH
DT
 in M8. Let us denote TDSj the 
threshold point for downward substitution in model j {M2, M4, M6, M8}. The 
following proposition describes how the probability of downward substitution changes 
with increasing variance in either u  or  when the other random variable is fixed at its 
mean. The proposition applies to any probability distribution that can be standardized, 
i.e., random variable X with mean  and standard deviation  can be written as X =  + 
Z where Z is the corresponding standardized random variable with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. The class of distributions that can be standardized includes distributions such 
as normal (standardized pdf = (z) =
20.51
2
ze


, z  (-, )), truncated normal 
(standardized pdf = (z) =  
20.51 /
2
a
z
a
e z dz



 , z  [-a, a]), and uniform (standardized 
pdf = (z) =
1
2 3
, z  3, 3 
 
). We let u and  denote the standard deviation of u  
and  , respectively. 
Proposition 2.10. For a probability distribution that can be standardized: a) When u 
= = 0, u > TDSj/Q, and  1u  < DL/Q for j {M2, M4, M6, M8}, the probability 
of downward substitution is equal to 1, and the probability of downward substitution is 
non-increasing in u (with  = 0) and in (with u = 0). b) When u = = 0, u < 
TDSj/Q or  1u  > DL/Q for j {M2, M4, M6, M8}, the probability of downward 
substitution is equal to 0, and the probability of downward substitution is non-decreasing 
in  (with u = 0). 
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Let us denote the probability that the firm engages in fruit trading as P(FT > 0) when 
at least one of the four decision variables related with fruit trading qBH, qSH, qBL, or qSL 
takes a positive value. It is important to remind that, when quality uncertainty is ignored 
as in earlier publications (e.g. Kazaz 2004, Kazaz and Webster 2011), the firm does not 
engage in fruit trading with probability 1 under significant supply uncertainty. 
Considering the high-end fruit as the only product in the model, this means that fruit 
trading does not occur when TBH < Qu  < TSH; and, when the supply random variable 
shows significant variation, it is clear that 0 < P(FT > 0) < 1. However, as shown in the 
following proposition, fruit trading occurs with probability 1, i.e., P(FT > 0) = 1 in M3, 
M4, and M7. Thus, the probability of fruit trading is not influenced by supply and quality 
variance. In the case of M3 and M4, this result is a consequence of the lack of price-
setting flexibility, whereas in M7, the result is due to the lack of downward substitution 
flexibility. In M8, which includes both pricing and downward substitution flexibilities, 
changes in supply variation can affect the probability of fruit trading. However, the 
probability of fruit trading is unaffected by changes in quality variation.  
Proposition 2.11. a) In M3, M4, and M7, the probability of fruit trading always equals 
1; b) For a probability distribution that can be standardized: In M8, when u = 0 and 
(TPH
DT
 + DL)/Q < u < (TSH + DL)/Q, the probability of fruit trading is 0, and its value is 
non-decreasing in u.   
2.6 Impact of Flexibilities on Vineyard Lease  
This section analyzes the firm’s vineyard lease investment decisions. Incorporating 
the optimal second-stage decisions developed in Section 2.5 into the first-stage objective 
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function, we first prove the concavity of the objective function of all models under supply 
and quality uncertainty; thus, each model has a unique optimal solution for its vineyard 
lease quantity that can be obtained from the first-order condition. 
Proposition 2.12. The first-stage objective functions in M1 through M8 are concave in 
Q.  
The following remark shows that uncertainty in supply and quality reduces the 
expected profit, but the addition of flexibilities increase the expected profit.  
Remark 2.2. 
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 where Π d
*
 
and E[Πj
*
] are the optimal profit under deterministic and stochastic supply and quality, 
respectively.   
We next present the analysis regarding how the initial vineyard lease investment 
decision, denoted Qj
*
 for each model j = M1, …, M8, varies with the introduction of 
different flexibilities. We begin our discussion with the inclusion of the fruit-trading 
flexibility. 
Proposition 2.13. For any model with fruit-trading flexibility (i.e., j  {M3, M4, M7, 
M8}),  
* * * *
0,  0,  0,  0
j j j j
H L H L
Q Q Q Q
b b s s
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   
   
. 
The above proposition implies that the introduction of fruit-trading flexibility on the 
optimal vineyard lease is ambiguous. The reason is that a model without fruit-trading 
flexibility is equivalent to a model with fruit-trading flexibility but with a very high 
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buying cost and a very low selling cost (i.e., not optimal to buy or sell in the open 
market). Thus, the introduction of fruit-trading flexibility can be viewed as a decrease in 
the buying cost, which puts downward pressure on the optimal vineyard lease, and an 
increase in the selling price, which puts upward pressure on the optimal vineyard lease. 
Depending on problem parameters, the optimal vineyard lease could increase or decrease 
when the fruit-trading flexibility is introduced. However, if the salvage values of excess 
fruit are sufficiently high, then it follows from Proposition 2.13 that the introduction of 
fruit-trading flexibility reduces the optimal lease. 
Corollary 2.1. If in models without fruit-trading flexibility (i.e., M1, M2, M5, M7), the 
firm is able to salvage excess high-quality fruit at sH and low-quality fruit at sL, then the 
flexibility to buy fruit in the open market reduces the optimal lease, i.e., QM3
*
 < QM1
*
, 
QM4
*
 < QM2
*
, QM7
*
 < QM5
*
, QM8
*
 < QM6
*
. 
The value gained from fruit trading decreases in the spread (or difference) between 
the buying cost and selling revenue from the open market, denoted δH and δL for the high-
quality and low-quality fruit, respectively. Let us define mH and mL as reference prices, 
where sH = mH – δH /2, bH = mH + δH /2, sL = mL – δL /2, and bL = mL + δL /2.  
Remark 2.3. The optimal expected profit is decreasing in δH and δL in all models that 
feature fruit-trading flexibility, i.e., M3, M4, M7 and M8.  
The above remark shows that the value from fruit trading diminishes with increasing 
spread between the buying cost of fruit and selling revenue from the fruit in the open 
market. The result follows from the fact that, at the optimal decision, a decrease in spread 
H or L will increase expected profit with no change in the decision variables (due to 
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lower buying and high selling prices). And profit increases further when decisions are re-
optimized at the new lower spread. 
While the inclusion of the fruit-trading flexibility decreases the vineyard lease when 
the firm can salvage its excess fruit at the open market price, the introduction of 
downward substitution can both increase and decrease the optimal vineyard lease. We 
next consider the impact of pricing flexibility in the high-end segment on vineyard lease. 
In order to have a fair comparison of the exogenous and endogenous price models, we set 
the exogenous price in the high-end market in M1 to pH(TPH). And for M3, which 
includes fruit trading flexibility, we consider the cases of exogenous price in high-end 
market at the buying and selling thresholds pH(TBH) and pH(TSH). In the presence of the 
fruit-trading flexibility, the following proposition states that the introduction of pricing 
flexibility decreases the optimal vineyard lease when the exogenous price is relatively 
low (i.e., at pH(TSH)), and increases the optimal vineyard lease when the exogenous price 
is relatively high (i.e., at pH(TBH)). In the absence of fruit-trading flexibility, the 
directional effect is ambiguous. However, the introduction of pricing flexibility decreases 
the optimal vineyard lease under the special case of linear demand and uniform demand.  
Proposition 2.14. a) When the exogenous price in the high-end segment in M3 is equal to 
pH(TBH), pricing flexibility increases vineyard lease in the presence of fruit-trading 
flexibility, i.e., QM7
*
 > QM3
*
; b) When the exogenous price in the high-end segment in M3 
is equal to pH(TSH), pricing flexibility decreases vineyard lease in the presence of fruit-
trading flexibility, i.e., QM7
*
 < QM3
*
; c) When exogenous price in the high-end segment in 
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M1 is pH(TPH), pricing flexibility reduces vineyard lease in the absence of fruit-trading 
flexibility, QM5
*
 < QM1
*
, under linear demand and uniform distribution.  
The consequence of the above proposition is that, when compared to the exogenous 
price models, the pricing flexibility generally reduces the firm’s vineyard lease 
investment regardless of the presence of the fruit-trading flexibility. However, when the 
exogenous price is high, and thus, the high-end demand is low, the addition of the pricing 
flexibility leads to an increase in the optimal vineyard lease decision.  
Like the pricing flexibility, the inclusion of the downward substitution flexibility does 
not generate a definitive directional effect for an arbitrary pdf defining the randomness in 
supply and quality. Recall that Proposition 2.4 has shown that downward substitution and 
pricing flexibilities can play a complementary role, and can create the incentive for the 
firm to make a higher initial investment, despite the fact that the firm downward 
substitutes more units with higher probability. Thus, their combined effect is not 
unidirectional. Therefore, we next present numerical illustrations that demonstrate their 
influence.   
2.7 Numerical Illustrations 
This section presents numerical illustrations that demonstrate how quality and supply 
uncertainty, and their correlation, influence optimal vineyard lease, associated expected 
profit, expected amount of high-quality fruit downward substituted, and the probability of 
downward substitution in various models. We use the following cost parameters: cl = 10, 
cH = 20, cL = 15, bH = 50, bL = 45, sH = 18, sL = 13. We consider linear demand functions 
DH(pH) = 100,000 − 200pH and DL = 120,000 − 300pL, which represent the demand 
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characteristics in the wine industry: (1) the market size for high-end segment is lower 
than that of the low-end segment, and (2) consumers’ price sensitivity is higher in the 
low-end segment. Given these parameters, we first establish the profit-maximizing price 
and quantity in each segment in Table 2.2.  
 
 
No Trading Trading 
 
*
Hp  H
TP  * ( )H Hp TS  HTB  
* ( )H Hp TS  HTS  
No Downward substitution 260 48,000 285 43,000 269 46,200 
Downward substitution 356.25 28,750 - - 282.5 43,500 
Table 2.2. Profit-maximizing price and demand. 
 
We use the profit-maximizing price as the exogenous price for the high-end segment 
in M1 – M4, and in the low-end segment in M1 – M8, i.e., pH = 260, pL = 207.5, DH(pH) = 
48,000 and DL = 57,750. Table 2.3 provides the comprehensive list of computational 
results, and reports the optimal vineyard lease, expected profit, expected amount of 
downward substitution (denoted E[w
*
]), and the probability of downward substation 
(denoted P(w
*
 > 0)) in each model for various levels of supply and quality uncertainty.  
Numerical illustrations confirm our earlier analytical results: (1) price-setting and 
downward substitution flexibilities play a complementary role; (2) fruit trading plays a 
substitutable role with pricing and downward substitution flexibilities; (3) fruit-trading 
flexibility reduces the optimal vineyard lease, and specifically, we have QM4
*
 < {QM1
*
, 
QM2
*
, QM3
*
}, QM3
*
 < QM1
*
, QM7
*
 < QM5
*
; (4) pricing flexibility decreases the optimal 
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vineyard lease, i.e., QM5
*
 < QM1
 *
, QM6
*
 < QM2
 *
, QM7
*
 < QM3
 *
, and QM8
*
 < QM4
 *
; (5) 
vineyard lease when all flexibilities are present (M8) is not always smaller than M6 that 
features pricing and downward substitution flexibilities; indeed, for lower supply 
variations QM6
*
 < QM8
*
, and for higher supply variations QM8
*
 < QM6
 *
. 
Because our numerical illustrations support our earlier analytical results, the 
following discussion emphasizes the impact of supply and quality uncertainty on the 
three flexibilities. Focusing on the percentage change in the expected profit when a 
flexibility is added into the model, our numerical illustrations demonstrate that the 
inclusion of price-setting and downward substitution flexibilities provides the biggest 
impact. In the absence of fruit-trading flexibility, downward substitution can increase 
expected profit of a winemaker by as much 9.82% in the presence of pricing flexibility in 
the high-end segment. The results also demonstrate that downward substitution is most 
beneficial under high quality variation and limited supply variation, i.e., when α and u are 
uniformly distributed in [0.1, 0.9] and [0.4, 0.6], respectively. However, the impact of 
downward substitution is significantly reduced under the following conditions: (1) in the 
presence of fruit-trading flexibility due to the substitutable role these two flexibilities 
play, and (2) under limited quality and significant supply variances. We next summarize 
the findings regarding the impact of quality and supply variations, and their correlation in 
these numerical illustrations.  
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Table 2.3. Summary of numerical results for M1-M8 correlation (expected profits are in 10
6
). 
Supply Quality
Uncertainty Uncertainty
u ~ Uniform α ~ Uniform Q* E[Π(Q*)] Q* E[Π(Q*)] E[w*] P(w* > 0) Q* E[Π(Q*)] Q* E[Π(Q*)] E[w*] P(w* > 0)
[0.4, 0.6] [0.4, 0.6] 266039 19.734 250060 20.041 1862.80 0.329 256056 20.387 245356 20.437 2025.41 0.358
[0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] 299466 19.229 257878 19.775 3926.24 0.383 279930 20.289 251444 20.386 4278.67 0.408
[0.4, 0.6] [0.2, 0.8] 342514 18.394 262937 19.243 6559.12 0.409 303179 20.139 254316 20.298 7051.54 0.431
[0.4, 0.6] [0.1, 0.9] 365217 17.175 262583 18.585 9692.22 0.432 305490 19.948 252703 20.196 10172.70 0.452
[0.3, 0.7] [0.4, 0.6] 299466 19.229 294555 19.417 988.94 0.184 279930 20.289 277164 20.318 1068.34 0.205
[0.3, 0.7] [0.3, 0.7] 316438 18.840 298625 19.269 2361.83 0.249 290786 20.220 280129 20.290 2634.59 0.284
[0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] 350153 18.133 309323 18.915 4541.68 0.314 309902 20.094 286630 20.225 5064.75 0.347
[0.3, 0.7] [0.1, 0.9] 373316 16.991 313027 18.313 7549.73 0.356 312265 19.915 285902 20.129 8130.12 0.386
[0.2, 0.8] [0.4, 0.6] 342514 18.394 339272 18.506 582.40 0.113 303179 20.139 300514 20.157 657.52 0.127
[0.2, 0.8] [0.3, 0.7] 350153 18.133 341902 18.415 1485.05 0.168 309902 20.094 303160 20.139 1674.84 0.190
[0.2, 0.8] [0.2, 0.8] 368661 17.605 348889 18.186 3114.29 0.240 323151 20.003 309405 20.096 3508.84 0.271
[0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9] 389889 16.615 356783 17.698 5808.04 0.300 326128 19.847 310622 20.015 6290.59 0.327
[0.1, 0.9] [0.4, 0.6] 365217 17.175 361760 17.253 409.65 0.079 305490 19.948 302805 19.961 489.41 0.095
[0.1, 0.9] [0.3, 0.7] 373316 16.991 364564 17.190 1044.56 0.118 312265 19.915 305472 19.948 1246.62 0.141
[0.1, 0.9] [0.2, 0.8] 389889 16.615 371673 17.028 2200.97 0.173 326128 19.847 311991 19.916 2621.92 0.206
[0.1, 0.9] [0.1, 0.9] 415045 15.842 384136 16.657 4364.64 0.239 336172 19.718 317351 19.850 4957.05 0.264
Supply Quality
Uncertainty Uncertainty
u ~ Uniform α ~ Uniform Q* E[Π(Q*)] Q* E[Π(Q*)] E[w*] P(w* > 0) Q* E[Π(Q*)] Q* E[Π(Q*)] E[w*] P(w* > 0)
[0.4, 0.6] [0.4, 0.6] 261799 19.750 227655 20.241 4269.96 0.562 252563 20.407 240386 20.465 2660.53 0.421
[0.4, 0.6] [0.3, 0.7] 284633 19.312 229519 20.149 6420.86 0.525 272992 20.316 244867 20.426 4900.48 0.443
[0.4, 0.6] [0.2, 0.8] 310476 18.641 234270 19.873 8705.33 0.500 294617 20.176 248319 20.348 7555.72 0.452
[0.4, 0.6] [0.1, 0.9] 330083 17.650 237493 19.383 11316.70 0.491 296863 19.993 247235 20.252 10613.00 0.466
[0.3, 0.7] [0.4, 0.6] 284633 19.312 265483 19.707 3234.35 0.349 272992 20.316 269494 20.350 1575.30 0.264
[0.3, 0.7] [0.3, 0.7] 296442 19.008 266228 19.664 4637.67 0.392 284131 20.252 272714 20.328 3192.15 0.322
[0.3, 0.7] [0.2, 0.8] 319575 18.420 270607 19.483 6911.77 0.417 301151 20.132 278480 20.271 5640.50 0.373
[0.3, 0.7] [0.1, 0.9] 337721 17.480 275965 19.066 9598.48 0.428 303447 19.961 278396 20.182 8664.31 0.404
[0.2, 0.8] [0.4, 0.6] 310476 18.641 301157 18.922 2587.46 0.303 294617 20.176 291475 20.197 983.68 0.170
[0.2, 0.8] [0.3, 0.7] 319575 18.420 302712 18.893 3517.35 0.307 301151 20.132 293743 20.182 2090.72 0.225
[0.2, 0.8] [0.2, 0.8] 337879 17.968 307547 18.774 5319.34 0.349 313921 20.044 299370 20.143 4025.18 0.300
[0.2, 0.8] [0.1, 0.9] 353342 17.133 315236 18.449 7942.77 0.378 316907 19.895 301533 20.069 6811.81 0.349
[0.1, 0.9] [0.4, 0.6] 330083 17.650 321525 17.848 1855.84 0.229 296863 19.993 293697 20.009 732.18 0.127
[0.1, 0.9] [0.3, 0.7] 337721 17.480 323074 17.819 2577.00 0.240 303447 19.961 295982 19.997 1556.18 0.168
[0.1, 0.9] [0.2, 0.8] 353342 17.133 327810 17.721 3963.28 0.282 316907 19.895 301786 19.969 3017.84 0.230
[0.1, 0.9] [0.1, 0.9] 373282 16.440 338025 17.460 6291.10 0.329 325886 19.771 307110 19.908 5389.58 0.285
M7 M8
M1 M2 M3 M4
M5 M6
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Influence of Quality Uncertainty: (1) Higher variation in quality decreases expected 
profits in all models; (2) Higher variation in quality generally increases vineyard lease. 
This result is consistent in M1 – M3 under exogenous price, and in M5 – M7 in the 
presence of pricing flexibility. However, vineyard lease exhibits both an increasing and 
decreasing behavior in quality variance in M4 and M8 due to the complementary 
behavior between pricing and downward substitution flexibilities. At limited supply 
variances, increasing quality variance initially increases the optimal vineyard lease, but 
with higher quality variations, it starts decreasing the optimal vineyard lease; (3) 
Variation in quality increases the expected amount of downward substitution in all 
models. 
Influence of supply uncertainty: (1) Higher supply variation reduces expected profit in all 
models; (2) Vineyard lease increases in supply variation; (3) Both expected amount of 
high-quality fruit downward substituted and the probability of downward substitution 
decrease in supply variation. While the result might appear to be surprising at a first look, 
it can be explained by the fact that, with higher supply variation, there is more of the crop 
for both high-quality and low-quality fruit, diminishing the need for downward 
substitution; (4) The firm leases a smaller vineyard when supply variation is low under 
downward substitution flexibility than it does under fruit-trading flexibility (i.e., QM2
*
 < 
QM3
*
); it leases a greater vineyard under downward substitution flexibility when supply 
variation is high than it does under fruit-trading flexibility (i.e., QM2
*
 > QM3
*
). 
We investigate the impact of correlation between supply and quality uncertainty, 
denoted with ρ. In our analysis, we restrict the conditional variance of quality for a given 
 59 
u, denoted Var[α│u], to be constant for a given u; this allows the overall quality variance, 
denoted Var[α], to change with respect to ρ (technical details of our derivations are 
provided in Appendix ). In the wine industry, supply and quality can typically have a 
positive correlation6; therefore, we restrict our numerical illustrations to the various levels 
of positive correlations. Table 2.4 presents the results of the numerical illustrations with 
various values of the correlation coefficient. In these calculations, supply random 
variable is distributed uniformly on [0.25, 0.75], but correlation changes the distribution 
of α.  
Influence of correlation between supply and quality: (1) Expected profit decreases with 
higher values of correlation. The result is a conse uence of a “distributional effect” which 
stems from the expansion in the tails of the distribution for quality uncertainty. With 
higher correlation, the overall quality variance increases, resulting in a higher quality risk 
and a lower the expected profit; (2) Without downward substitution flexibility, an 
increase in correlation causes an increase in vineyard lease, which can be explained again 
by the same distributional effect. Downward substitution, however, can cause a decrease 
in the amount of vineyard lease with higher values of the correlation coefficient. This is 
because downward substitution flexibility takes advantage of the expansion in tails of 
quality uncertainty distribution, and negates the detrimental consequences of 
distributional effect; (3) In the presence of downward substitution flexibility, an increase 
in correlation has similar effects with those presented for quality uncertainty. 
                                                 
6 The positive correlation between supply (abundance of grapes) and quality (high scores) can be 
exemplified by the 2005 vintage in Bordeaux wines. The unusually high number of sunny and warm days 
resulted in the highest amount of fruit crop with the highest ratings achieved from the two most influential 
publications: the Wine Spectator and the Wine Advocate. 
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Specifically, while the probability of high-quality fruit downward substituted increases in 
correlation (due to higher quality variation), the expected amount of downward 
substitution can exhibit a decreasing behavior with higher values of correlation (see 
models M2 and M6). The latter has the same characteristics of downward substitution 
behavior. 
 
 
 
Table 2.4. Summary of numerical results for models under increasing correlation 
(expected profits are in 10
6
). 
2.8. Discussion on Price-Setting in Both Segments and Downward-Substitution 
Flexibilities 
Earlier analysis has shown that the pricing flexibility in the high-end segment 
increases the level of downward substitution. If the firm has the pricing flexibility in the 
low-end segment as well, does this additional flexibility lead to another increase in 
downward substitution? We next investigate the impact of pricing flexibility in the low-
end segment on the conditions for downward substitution using models M9 and M10. It 
should be stated here that, in the motivating application of this study, the winemaker 
cannot set a selling price for its low-end product. However, such a comparison sheds light 
ρ Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] E [w
*
] P (w
* 
> 0) Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] E [w
*
] P (w
* 
> 0)
0.25 343634 18.365 320124 18.702 1929.72 0.226 310954 20.145 292740 20.205 2405.78 0.262
0.375 347603 18.313 318223 18.621 1877.90 0.228 314081 20.141 290951 20.201 2470.78 0.265
0.5 351191 18.203 315448 18.513 2015.53 0.232 316996 20.131 288401 20.194 2726.79 0.271
ρ Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] E [w
*
] P (w
*
 > 0) Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] Q
*
E [Π(Q
*
)] E [w
*
] P (w
* 
> 0)
0.25 319967 18.679 284720 19.235 4093.85 0.359 303970 20.182 284631 20.249 2903.42 0.298
0.375 323700 18.665 283174 19.194 4010.78 0.363 307133 20.180 283015 20.247 2949.20 0.300
0.5 327217 18.602 281003 19.131 4087.78 0.368 310078 20.172 280800 20.242 3177.14 0.304
M1 M2 M3 M4
M5 M6 M7 M8
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into the similarities and differences of our model with an earlier model established in 
Tomlin and Wang (2008) where the firm has the price-setting flexibility in both 
segments.  
With price-setting flexibility in both the high- and low-end segments, downward 
substitution occurs when the marginal revenues from the two market segments are equal. 
The following proposition defines the threshold for the production amount in the low-end 
segment.  
Proposition 2.15. The threshold for the amount of low-quality fruit to be produced from 
the internal resource for M9 is  * *'L L pL L LTP p c D p     . 
When the realized amount of low-quality grapes is less than the production threshold 
(i.e., Qu(1–α) ≤ TPL), the firm charges a market-clearing price pL(Qu(1–α)). However, 
when there is excess amount of low-quality fruit (i.e., Qu(1–α) > TPL), the firm sells TPL 
at price pL(TPL). Adapting the regions for the low-end threshold quantity, we have the 
following regions for M9: 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α) < TPL } 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α)  TPL } 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α) < TPL } 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α)  TPL }  
The optimal second-stage quantity decisions for M9 are  
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and the optimal prices are pH
*
 = pH(qIH
*
) and pL
*
 = pH(qIL
*
).  
In the analysis of M10, equivalent to the model of Tomlin and Wang (2008), we 
follow a similar approach, and equate the marginal revenues from the two market 
segments in order to obtain the critical quality realization that would trigger the 
downward substitution decision. When there is insufficient low-quality fruit to fulfill the 
threshold, i.e., Qu(1–α) < TPL, the revenue and the marginal revenue become: 
       , , 1 1L L pLQ u p Qu c Qu        . 
Moreover, the critical quality realization for downward substitution can be obtained by 
setting the marginal return from the low-end segment to the marginal return in the high-
end segment 
   , , / , , /L HQ u Q u            . 
Considering the case when the price in the low-end segment of M6 is equal to the 
profit-maximizing price of M10, we show that the probability of downward substitution 
in M10 is always greater than or equal to that of M6. This is because the profit-
maximizing price in the low-end segment, denoted pL
*
 is smaller than or equal to the 
market-clearing price of pL(Qu(1– α)), and thus, TPH
D
 of M10 is smaller than that of M6. 
Downward substitution continues to take place until the high-quality fruit exceeds TPH.  
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Proposition 2.16. For a given Q, P(w
*
 > 0) in M10 is greater than or equal to that of 
M6.    
Section 2.5.4 has shown that the firm always engages in fruit trading in M3, M4, and 
M7 with probability 1 under supply and quality uncertainty, and in M8 with probability 1 
under quality uncertainty alone. The following proposition shows that: (1) quality 
uncertainty influences the probability of fruit trading, (2) the probability of fruit trading is 
not always equal to 1 under significant supply and quality variation when the firm can set 
prices in both segments as in M11.  
Proposition 2.17. For a probability distribution that can be standardized: a) When u 
= = 0 in M11, and (TBH/QM11) <u < (TSH/QM11) and (TBL/QM11) <  1u  < 
(TSL/QM11), the probability of fruit trading is equal to 1, and is non-increasing in u (with 
 = 0) and in (with u = 0). b) When u = = 0, u < (TBH/QM11), or u > 
(TSH/QM11), or  1u  < (TBL/QM11), or  1u  > (TSL/QM11) in M11, the probability 
of fruit trading is equal to 0, and is non-decreasing in  (with u = 0). 
2.9 Conclusions 
The essay examines the interactions between the three forms of operational flexibility 
available to agricultural firms in mitigating supply and quality uncertainty. These 
flexibilities are: (1) downward substitution, where high-quality fruit can be used in the 
making of a low-end product, (2) price-setting, where the firm can influence the demand 
of the high-end product by appropriately selecting the selling price in the high-end 
segment (in which consumers are less price-elastic); and (3) fruit trading flexibility, 
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where the firm can purchase additional fruit in the event of lower supply realizations, or 
sell some of its excess fruit in the open market for revenue. The essay provides a 
comprehensive analysis that demonstrates the interrelationships between these three 
forms of operational flexibilities.  
The essay makes three sets of main contributions. First, the study identifies the 
interrelationships between the above three forms of flexibilities; not all flexibilities 
exhibit a substitutable role. Our essay proves that pricing and downward substitution 
flexibilities play a complementary role. Pricing flexibility enables the firm to engage in 
downward substitution early and frequently, yielding higher expected amount and 
probability of downward substitution. Fruit trading flexibility, on the other hand, does not 
influence downward substitution in the absence of pricing flexibility, but plays a 
substitutable role to downward substitution in the presence of pricing flexibility. It also 
exhibits a substitutable role to pricing flexibility.   
Second, our results provide insight into how these three forms of flexibilities 
influence the winemaker’s initial vineyard investment. The inclusion of fruit trading 
generally decreases the optimal amount of vineyard lease. Pricing and downward 
substitution flexibilities (and their combination), however, can lead to both an increase 
and a decrease in the optimal vineyard lease. The latter occurs under limited supply and 
significant quality variances.  
Our third contribution relates to the impact of the variation in supply and quality 
uncertainty on vineyard lease, expected profits, expected amount and probability of 
downward substitution. Variation in quality uncertainty does not influence the probability 
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of fruit trading, always decreases the expected profits, and increases the expected amount 
of downward substitution. Higher variations in quality generally increases vineyard lease, 
but can also show a decreasing behavior in the presence of downward substitution 
flexibility. Variation in supply generally increases the firm’s vineyard lease, reduces 
expected profits, and decreases the expected amount and probability of downward 
substitution in all models. Significant variation in quality and limited variation in supply 
makes downward substitution more attractive; they reduce the need to rely on vineyard 
lease. While increasing quality variation generally increases the probability of downward 
substitution, the likelihood of a crop supply and demand mismatch is reduced at lower 
supply realizations; therefore, the probability of downward substitution can exhibit a 
decreasing behavior in quality variance in the presence of low supply variations. The 
correlation coefficient mimics the reactions observed under increasing quality variation. 
2.10 Future Research Directions 
This study develops a model to examine the influence of supply and quality 
uncertainty on three forms of operational flexibility: Downward substitution, price-
setting, and fruit-trading flexibilities. In this section, we discuss possible extensions to the 
original model in order to provide future research directions.  
The current model assumes a deterministic demand function for both customer 
segments. Demand uncertainty can be incorporated into our modeling approach and the 
ensuing analysis. Due to the dynamics of the present world economy, as evident from the 
recent collapse of the European economy and the rise of the Chinese and Indian markets 
as the new economic powerhouses, one can argue that the demand for luxury products 
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such as wine may not be deterministic, but in fact should resemble the unpredictable 
nature of the world economy. Therefore, to incorporate demand uncertainty into our 
existing model, we can describe the high- and low-end demand as DH(pH, εH) and DL(εL), 
where εH and εL are the respective random error terms. To analyze the problem, we can 
utilize the price-elasticity of lost sales probability conditions developed in Kocabıyıkoğlu 
and Popescu (2011) in order to arrive at sufficient conditions that lead to unique optimal 
solutions for the simultaneous price and quantity decisions under demand uncertainty. 
Using these price-elasticity of lost sales probability conditions, we can obtain a new set 
of production, downward substitution and fruit-trading thresholds that define the 
winemaker’s downward substitution, pricing and fruit-trading decisions. We intuit that 
the inclusion of demand uncertainty will not alter the underlying structural properties of 
the production and downward substitution thresholds established by Proposition 2.7. If 
they do, however, the study can develop the set of conditions that would retain the 
characteristics of the optimal decisions presented in this study.  
A winemaker does not have the price-setting flexibility in the low-end market in the 
current model. Incorporating demand uncertainty into the model is expected to increase 
the probability and frequency of the mismatch between supply and demand in the low-
end market segment beyond the reported levels in our model. As a result, we conjecture 
that incorporating demand uncertainty into the model while retaining supply and quality 
uncertainty will create additional incentives for the winemaker to utilize the downward 
substitution flexibility more frequently in order to offset the shortages in the low-end 
market segment.  
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 2.11 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: In M2, with the absence of price-setting and fruit-trading 
flexibility, the winemaker engages in downward substitution when there high-quality 
fruit realization is higher than the high-end demand and the low-quality fruit realization is 
below the low-end demand i.e. Quα > DH and Qu(1−α) ≤ DL. Therefore it is possible to 
see that downward substitution occurs when DH/Qα < u ≤ DL/Qu(1−α). 
In M4, with the absence of price-setting flexibility, due to the fact that downward 
substitution can only occurs when sH ≤ bL, the winemaker is better off when downward 
substituting excess high-quality fruit for the production of low-end wine comparing to 
selling the high-quality fruit in the open market. Therefore, in M4 downward substitution 
occurs when Quα > DH and Qu(1−α) ≤ DL or DH/Qα < u ≤ DL/Qu(1−α). This is 
equivalent to the M2. From this analysis it is possible to say that the introduction of fruit-
trading flexibility does not change the probability of downward substitution or the 
expected amount of downward substitution.  
Proof of Proposition 2.2: The high-end threshold production quantity is obtained by 
maximizing  
     H H pH H Hp p c D p    
(i.e., it is optimal for the firm to set the production quantity equal to demand). The profit 
function is concave because pHDH(pH) is concave by assumption. Thus the optimal price 
and threshold production quantity are given by the first-order condition 
       ' ' 0H H pH H H H Hp p c D p D p     , 
which can be rewritten as  
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   * *'H H pH H HTP p c D p   .  
Proof of Proposition 2.3: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.2, but the 
profit function now includes the margin from the low-end segment, pL – cpL.  The high-
end profit function is  
          H H pH H H L pL H Hp p c D p p c Qu D p      . 
The profit function is concave because pHDH(pH) is concave by assumption. Thus the 
optimal price and threshold production quantity are given by the first-order condition 
        ' ' 0H H pH L pL H H H Hp p c p c D p D p       , 
which can be rewritten as  
    * *'DH H pH L pL H HTP p c p c D p     . 
From the proof of Proposition 2.2, the optimal price for M5 (without downward 
substitution) satisfies 
       M5 M5 M5 M5M5 ' ' 0H H pH H H H Hp p c D p D p     . 
As shown above, the optimal price for M6 (with downward substitution) satisfies 
           M6 M6 M6 M6 M6M6 ' ' ' 0H H pH H H H H L pL H Hp p c D p D p p c D p       . 
Thus, from DH(p) < 0, it follows that  
           M5 M5 M5 M5 M5M6 ' ' ' 0H H pH H H H H L pL H Hp p c D p D p p c D p       , 
which implies M6 M5
H Hp p and    M6 M5DH H H H H HTP D p D p TP   .  
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Proof of Proposition 2.4: Recall that  =DL – Qu. For M2 at exogenous high-end 
product price pH = pH(TPH) and high-end product demand DH = TPH, the optimal quantity 
decisions are 
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(see (2.5)). For M6, the optimal quantity decisions are 
 
    
    
   
  
* * *
,0, 1                  if  and 1
, , 1   if +  and 1
,0,                             if  and 1
, ,
, , 1           i
D
H L
D D D D
H H H H L
L H L
IH IL
Qu Qu Qu TP Qu D
TP Qu TP Qu TP Qu TP Qu D
Qu D Qu TP Qu D
q w q
Qu Qu
   
   
  
 
   
      
  

    
    
   
f +  and 1
, , 1                   if  and 1
,0,                               if  and 1
D
H H L
H H L
H L H L
TP Qu TP Qu D
TP Qu TP Qu Qu D
TP D Qu TP Qu D
 
  
 






      

      

  
 
(see (2.7)). We see that the optimal quantity decisions for M2 and M6 are identical when 
Qu( 1 – )  DL. However, when Qu( 1 – ) < DL, we see that w
*
 > 0 iff Qu > TPH for 
M2 and that w
*
 > 0 iff Qu > D
HTP  for M6. From 
D
HTP < TPH (see Proposition 2.3), it 
follows that the probability of downward substitution is higher for M6 than for M2. 
Furthermore, for any Q, u, and , we see that * *6 2M Mw w  (with strict inequality for some 
parameter values), and thus the expected amount of fruit downward substituted is greater 
with price flexibility (M6) and without price flexibility (M2).  
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Proof of Proposition 2.5: The proof is similar to the proofs of propositions 2 and 3. 
Given excess high-quality fruit supply, the high-end profit function is  
        H H pH H H H H Hp p c D p s Qu D p     . 
The first-order condition yields TSH. Given a shortage of high-quality fruit supply, the 
high-end profit function is  
        H H pH H pH H H Hp p c Qu p c b D p Qu        , 
The first-order condition yields TBH. The inequality TBH < TSH, follows from bH > sH.  
Proof of Proposition 2.6: For M3, the firm buys quantity DH – Qu of fruit in the open 
market iff Qu < DH and sells quantity Qu – DH of fruit in the open market iff Qu > 
DH. For M7, the firm buys quantity TBH – Qu  of fruit in the open market iff Qu < TBH 
and sells quantity Qu – TSH of fruit in the open market iff Qu > TSH. The result 
follows from TBH < DH < TSH.  
Proof of Proposition 2.7: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3, but the 
profit function replaces the margin from the low-end segment (pL – cpL) with the cost of 
purchasing low-quality fruit in the open market (bL). The high-end profit function is  
        H H pH H H L H Hp p c D p b Qu D p     . 
The profit function is concave because pHDH(pH) is concave by assumption. Thus the 
optimal price and threshold production quantity are given by the first-order condition 
       ' ' 0H H pH L H H H Hp p c b D p D p      , 
which can be rewritten as  
   * *'DTH H pH L H HTP p c b D p    . 
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The inequality,  * *'DTH H H H H pH H H HTB TP TS TP p c s D p         , follows from bH 
> bL > sH > 0. 
 Recall that     * *'DH H pH L pL H HTP p c p c D p     (see Proposition 2.3). From bL < 
pL – cpL (see assumption (A1)), it follows that 
DT D
H HTP TP .  
Proof of Proposition 2.8 Recall that  =DL – Qu. For M4, at exogenous high-end 
product price pH = pH(TPH) and high-end product demand DH = TPH, the optimal quantity 
decisions are given in (2.6). For M8, the optimal quantity decisions are given in (2.8).  
(see (2.6)).  
We see that the optimal quantity decisions for M4 and M8 are identical when Qu( 1 – 
)  DL. However, when Qu( 1 – ) < DL, we see that w
*
 > 0 iff Qu > TPH for M4 and 
that w
*
 > 0 iff Qu > DT
HTP  for M8. From 
DT
HTP < TPH (see Proposition 2.7), it follows that 
the probability of downward substitution is higher for M8 than for M4. Furthermore, for 
any Q, u, and , we see that * *
M8 M4w w  (with strict inequality for some parameter 
values), and thus the expected amount of fruit downward substituted is greater with price 
flexibility (M8) than without price flexibility (M4).  
Proof of Proposition 2.9: For M6, the production threshold (and downward substitution 
threshold) is  
    * *'DH H pH L pL H HTP p c p c D p      
(see Proposition 2.3). For M8, the production threshold (and downward substitution 
threshold) is DTHTP , and for M6, the production threshold is
D
HTP . From 
DT D
H HTP TP  (see 
 72 
Proposition 2.7), it follows that the probability of downward substitution is greater 
without fruit-trading flexibility (M6) and with fruit-trading flexibility (M8). Furthermore, 
for any Q, u, and , * *
M6 M8w w  (with strict inequality for some parameter values), and 
thus the expected amount of fruit downward substituted is greater without fruit-trading 
flexibility (M6) than with fruit-trading flexibility (M8).  
Proof of Proposition 2.10: a) If u = = 0, then by the definition of TDSj, there is 
downward substitution when u > TDSj/Q and  1u  < DL/Q, i.e., the probability of 
downward substitution is equal to 1.  
We will now show that the probability of downward substitution is non-increasing in 
u (with  = 0). Because the probability distribution of u can be standardized, the cdf of 
u can be written as u
u
u u

 
  
 
 where u(z) is the corresponding standardized cdf. Let u1 
=
jTDS
Q
 and u2 =
 1
LD
Q 
 and note that u1 <u < u2. Accordingly, the probability of 
downward substitution is   1 2,P u u u  = 2 2u u
u u
u u u u
 
    
    
   
. From 
2 / 0u
u
u u


 
   
 
 (due to u2 > u ) and 
1 / 0u
u
u u


 
   
 
 (due to u1 < u ), it follows 
that   1 2, / 0uP u u u     , and thus the probability of downward substitution is non-
increasing in u. Similar arguments, which are also illustrated in part b) below, can be 
used to show that the probability of downward substitution is non-increasing in  (with 
u = 0). 
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b) If u = = 0, then by the definition of TDSj, there is no downward substitution 
when u < TDSj/Q or  1u  > DL/Q, i.e., the probability of downward substitution is 
equal to 0.  
We will now show that the probability of downward substitution is non-decreasing in 
  (with u = 0). Because the probability distribution of  can be standardized, the cdf of 
 can be written as 

 

 
  
 
 where (z) is the corresponding standardized cdf. Let 
1 = max ,1
j L
TDS D
Qu Qu
 
 
 
 and note that 1 > . Accordingly, the probability of 
downward substitution is  1P    =
11 

 

 
  
 
. From 1 / 0

 


 
   
 
 (due 
to 1 > ), it follows that  1 / 0P       , and thus the probability of downward 
substitution is non-decreasing in .  
Proof of Proposition 2.11: The proof of part a) follows from the definition of the trading 
threshold values. The proof of b) is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.10. We omit the 
details.  
Proof of Proposition 2.12: a) The expected profit for model M8 can be written as: 
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Let us define the boundary points: u1(Q,α) = TBH/Qα, u2(Q,α) = TSH/Qα, u3(Q,α) = 
TPH
DT
/Qα, u4(Q) = (TPH
DT
+DL)/Q, u5(Q) = (TSH+DL)/Q and α1(Q,u) = 1 – (DL/Qu)   
Note that: u1
'
(Q,α) = ∂u1(Q,α)/∂Q ≤ 0, u2
'
(Q,α) = ∂u2(Q,α)/∂Q ≤ 0 , u3
'
(Q,α) = 
∂u3(Q,α)/∂Q ≤ 0, u4
'
(Q) = ∂u4(Q)/∂Q ≤ 0, u5
'
(Q) = ∂u5(Q)/∂Q ≤ 0 and α1
'
(Q,u )= 
∂α1(Q,u)/∂Q > 0. 
Taking the first-order derivative of the first-stage objective function E[ΠM8(Q)] gives:  
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From the first-order condition at boundary points: u1(Q,α), u2(Q,α), u3(Q,α), u4(Q) 
and u5(Q), the optimal price must satisfies: 
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Taking the second-order derivative of the first-stage objective function E[ΠM8(Q)] gives: 
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Because the derivatives at the boundary point of each region, the second-order 
derivatives cancel out, yielding the following expression:  
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The above is negative because of the assumption that 2pi′(qi) + pi′′ (qi) ≤ 0, and 
∂
2
E[ΠM8(Q)]/∂Q
2
  < 0. Thus, M8 first-stage objective function is continuous and concave 
in the amount of vineyard lease Q.  
b) In model M7, the optimal second stage decision can be divided into the following sets:  
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
R5(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R6(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}. 
Accordingly, the optimal second-stage quantity decisions for M7 are: 
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Therefore, the first-stage objective function can be written as:  
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Rewriting the first-stage objective function according to the returns from high and low-
end segments: 
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Taking the first-order derivative of the first-stage objective function provides:
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Similar to part a) let us define the boundary points: α1(Q,u) = 1 – (DL/Qu), α2(Q,u) = 
TBH/Qu and α3(Q,u) = TSH/Qu; and note that α1
'
(Q,u ) = ∂α1(Q,u)/∂Q > 0, α2
'
(Q,u ) = 
∂α2(Q,u)/∂Q ≤ 0 and α3
'
(Q,u ) = ∂α3(Q,u)/∂Q ≤ 0 . 
From the first-order condition, at the boundary point α2(Q,u) and α3(Q,u), the optimal 
price satisfies: 
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Therefore, taking the second-order derivative of M7 objective function gives: 
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The above expression is negative because 2pi′(qi) + pi′′ (qi) ≤ 0 and because bL > sL; thus 
∂
2
E[ΠM7(Q)]/∂Q
2
 < 0 and the first-stage objective function in M7 is continuous and 
concave the amount of vineyard lease Q.  
c) The optimal second-stage decisions for model M6 can be divided into the following 
sets: 
R1a(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα  D
HTP and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R1b(Q) = {(u, α) : D
HTP < Quα 
D
HTP   and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
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R3a(Q) = {(u, α) : D
HTP  < Quα  TPH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3b(Q) = {(u, α) : TPH +  < Quα and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
As a result of this the first-stage objective function of model M6 can be written as: 
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.  
The proof can be completed by setting the cost of purchasing fruit in the open market to 
be infinitely high and the revenue from selling the fruit in the open market to be 0 in 
model M8, i.e. bH =bL = ∞ and sH = sL = 0. From Proposition 2.5 and Proposition 2.7, it is 
possible to show that pH(TPH) = pH(TSH), pH(TBH) = ∞ and pH(TPH
D
) = pH(TPH
DT
), 
resulting in TPH = TSH , TBH = 0 and TPH
D 
= TPH
DT
. Furthermore, as the cost of buying 
fruit in the low-end segment is infinitely high, and the selling price of the fruit is zero, the 
fruit-trading flexibility in the low-end segment becomes unattractive for the winemaker, 
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resulting in qBL and qSL to equal 0. As a result of this analysis, regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) 
from model M8 collapses to 0 while regions R3a(Q), R3b(Q), R4(Q), R5a(Q) R5b(Q) 
and R6(Q)  in model M8 are equivalent to regions R1a(Q), R1b(Q), R2(Q), R3a(Q) 
R3b(Q) and R4(Q) of model M6 respectively. From this analysis the first-stage objective 
function of model M8 can be written as:   
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As the first stage objective function of both models are now identical, i.e. E[Π
M6
(Q)] = 
E[Π
M8
(Q)], the proof that model M8 is continuous and concave in the vineyard lease Q 
holds true for model M6.  
d) The optimal second-stage decisions for model M5 can be divided into the following 
sets: 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
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R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TPH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
The first-stage objective function of model M5 can be written as: 
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The proof can be completed by setting the cost of purchasing fruit in the open market to 
be infinitely high and the selling price of the fruit in the open market to be 0 in model 
M7, i.e. bH =bL = ∞ and sH = sL = 0.  From Proposition 2.5, it is possible to show that 
pH(TPH) = pH(TSH), pH(TBH) = ∞ resulting in TPH = TSH and TBH = 0. Furthermore as the 
cost of buying fruit in the low-end segment is infinitely high and the selling price of the 
fruit is 0, the fruit-trading flexibility in the low-end segment becomes unattractive for the 
winemaker, resulting in qBL and qSL to equal 0. As a result, regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) 
from model M7 collapses to 0 awhile region while regions R3(Q), R4(Q), R5a(Q) 
R5b(Q) and R6(Q)  in model M7 are equivalent to regions R1(Q), R2(Q), R3(Q) and 
R4(Q) of model M5 respectively. The first-stage objective function can then be written 
as:    
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Because the first-stage objective functions of both model are identical, i.e. E[ΠM5(Q)] = 
E[ΠM7(Q)], the proof that model M7 is continuous and concave in the vineyard lease Q 
holds true for model M5.  
e) The expected profit for model M4 can be written as: 
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Let us define the boundary points: u6(Q,α) = DH/Qα, u7(Q) = (DH+DL)/Q and α1(Q,u) = 1 
– (DL/Qu)   
Note that: u6
'
(Q,α) = ∂u6(Q,α)/∂Q ≤ 0, u7
'
(Q) = ∂u7(Q)/∂Q ≤ 0 and α1
'
(Q,u ) = ∂α1(Q,u)/∂Q 
> 0. 
Taking the first-order derivative of the first-stage objective function E[ΠM4(Q)] gives:  
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Taking the second-order derivative of the first-stage objective provides: 
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Observe that, because bH > sH, bL > sL and bH > bL, while u6
'
(Q,α) and u7
'
(Q,α) are 
negative, the second-order derivative of model M4 first stage objective function is 
negative, i.e. ∂
2
E[ΠM4(Q)]/∂Q
2
 < 0 , and thus M4 first stage objective function is 
continuous and concave in the amount of vineyard lease Q.  
f) In model M3, the optimal second stage decision can be divided into the following sets:  
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
Accordingly, the optimal second-stage quantity decisions for M7 are: 
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Therefore, the first-stage objective function can be written as:  
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
R1
R2
M3
R3
,
1
,
1
,
1
H pH H H H
Q L pL L L L
H pH H H H
Q L pL L L L
l
H pH H H H
Q L pL L L L
H pH
p c b D b Qu
g u dud
p c b D b Qu
p c b D b Qu
g u dud
p c s D s Qu
E Q c Q
p c s D s Qu
g u dud
p c b D b Qu
p c s

 


 


 

   
 
     
 
   
 
     
 
     
   
 
     
 
 




 
   
 
 R4
,
1
H H H
Q L pL L L L
D s Qu
g u dud
p c s D s Qu

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
      
  

 
Rewriting the first-stage objective function according to the returns from high and low-
end segments: 
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Taking the first-order derivative of the above expression gives: 
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Let us define the boundary points: α1(Q,u) = 1 – (DL/Qu), α4(Q,u) = DH/Qu and note that, 
α1
'
(Q,u ) = ∂α1(Q,u)/∂Q > 0 and α4
'
(Q,u ) = ∂α4(Q,u)/∂Q ≤ 0. 
Therefore taking the second-order derivative of M3 first-stage objective function gives: 
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Observe that, because bH > sH, bL > sL, α1
'
(Q,u) > 0 and α6
'
(Q,u) < 0, the second-order 
derivative of model M3 first stage objective function is negative, i.e. ∂
2
E[ΠM3(Q)]/∂Q
2
 < 
0, and thus, the first-stage objective function of M3 is continuous and concave in the 
amount of vineyard lease Q.  
g) In model M2, the optimal second stage decision can be divided into the following sets:  
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
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R3a(Q) = {(u, α) : DH < Quα  DH +  and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R3b(Q) = {(u, α) : DH +  < Quα and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
The proof can be completed by setting the cost of purchasing fruit in the open market to 
be infinitely high and the selling price of the fruit in the open market to be 0 in model 
M4, i.e. bH =bL = ∞ and sH = sL = 0. It is possible to show that the fruit-trading flexibility 
in the low-end segment becomes unattractive for the winemaker, resulting in qBL and qSL 
to equal 0. As a result, the returns from all five regions in model M4 become identical to 
the returns in the five regions of model M2. Therefore, the first-stage objective function 
of the model can be written as:   
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Therefore, as the first stage objective function of both model are equivalent, i.e. 
E[ΠM4(Q)] = E[ΠM2(Q)], the proof that model M4 is continuous and concave in the 
vineyard lease Q holds true for model M2.  
h) In model M1, the optimal second stage decision can be divided into the following sets:  
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
 90 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > DH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
The proof can be completed by setting the cost of purchasing fruit in the open market to 
be infinitely high and the selling price of the fruit in the open market to be 0 in model 
M3, i.e. bH =bL = ∞ and sH = sL = 0. In this case, fruit-trading in the low-end segment 
becomes unattractive, resulting in qBL = qSL = 0. As a result, the returns from all four 
regions in model M3 become identical to the returns in the four regions of model M1. 
Therefore the first-stage objective function can be written as:   
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Because the first-stage objective function of both models are equivalent, i.e. E[Π
M3
(Q)] = 
E[Π
M1
(Q)], the proof that model M3 is continuous and concave in the vineyard lease Q 
holds true for model M1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.13: By the implicit function theorem, for parameter a  {bH, bL, 
sH, sL},  
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From Proposition 2.12,  2 * 2/ 0jE Q Q      , so the sign of (2.9) is determined by the 
sign of  2 * /jE Q Q a      . Consider the case of a = bH. At the optimal lease quantity 
for model j, there exists a set of realizations of  ,u  , denoted BH, where the firm buys 
high-quality fruit from the open market. The optimal expected profit can be decomposed 
into two terms—one term that includes parameter bH and another term, denoted A
*
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that does not include bH (i.e., ∂
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A
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A similar approach can be used to show 
* * *
 0,  0,  0
j j j
L H L
Q Q Q
b s s
  
  
  
. We omit the 
details.   
Proof of Corollary 2.1: i) The first-stage objective function for model M1 when the firm 
can sell its fruit in the open market can be written as follows: 
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The first-order derivative of the first-stage objective function in model M1 is equal to:
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Equating the above first-order derivative to zero provides QM1
*
 where at Q = QM1
*
, we 
have  
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 We next consider the objective function of model M3: 
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p c s D s Qu p c b D b Qu g u dud
p c s D s Qu

 

   
   
   
      
     
 
         
 
         
 
   



     
 R4
1 ,L pL L L L
Q
p c s D s Qu g u dud        
 
 
The first-order derivative of model M3 is: 
     
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
M3
R1
R2
R3
R4
/ 1 ,
1 ,
1 ,
1 ,
l H L
Q
H L
Q
H L
Q
H L
Q
E Q Q c b u b u g u dud
b u s u g u dud
s u b u g u dud
s u s u g u dud
   
   
   
   
             
    
    
    




 
Evaluating the first-order derivative at Q = QM1
*
 and substituting the above expression for 
cl provides: 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
     
 
*
M1
*
M1
*
M1
*
M1
M3
R1
R2
R3
/ ,
1
,
1 ,
0
H pH H
Q Q
Q L pL L
H pH H
Q
L pL L
Q
p c b u
E Q Q g u dud
p c b u
p c b u g u dud
p c b u g u dud

 

  
  

  
       
    
 
   
 
    
 




 
because pH – cpH – bH > 0 and pL – cpL – bL > 0. This implies that QM3
*
 is less than QM1
*
. 
ii) The first-stage objective function for  M2 can be written as: 
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         
 
       
 
      
 
       
 
 
M2
R1
R2
R3a
R3b
1 ,
1 ,
,
,
l H pH L pL
Q
H pH L pL L L L
Q
H pH H L pL H
Q
H pH H H H L L pL L
Q
H pH H H
E Q c Q p c Qu p c Qu g u dud
p c Qu p c s D s Qu g u dud
p c D p c Qu D g u dud
p c D s Qu D D p c D g u dud
p c s D s
   
   
 
 
            
       
 
     
 
       
 
   




     
 R4
1 ,H L pL L L L
Q
Qu p c s D s Qu g u dud        
 
 
and the first-order derivative is equal to: 
         
 
     
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
M2
R1
R2 R3a
R3b R4
/ 1 ,
1 , ,
, 1 ,
l H pH L pL
Q
H pH L L pL
Q Q
H H L
Q Q
E Q Q c p c u p c u g u dud
p c u s u g u dud p c u g u dud
s u g u dud s u s u g u dud
   
     
     
              
        
   
     

 
 
 
Equating the above first-order derivative to zero provides QM2
*
 where at Q = QM2
*
, we 
have  
       
 
     
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
*
M2
* *
M 2 M 2
* *
M2 M2
R1
R2 R3a
R3b R4
1 ,
1 , ,
, 1 ,
l H pH L pL
Q
H pH L L pL
Q Q
H H L
Q Q
c p c u p c u g u dud
p c u s u g u dud p c u g u dud
s u g u dud s u s u g u dud
   
     
     
     
 
        
   
     

 
 
 
 We next consider the objective function of model M4: 
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 
 
   
 
 
       
 
      
 
   
M4
R1
R2
R3a
,
1
1 ,
,
H pH H H H
l
Q L pL L L L
H pH H H H L pL L L L
Q
H pH H H L pL L H
Q
H pH H H H H L L
p c b D b Qu
E Q c Q g u dud
p c b D b Qu
p c b D b Qu p c s D s Qu g u dud
p c s D p c b Qu D g u dud
p c s D s Qu D D p

 

   
 
   
      
     
 
         
 
       
 
       



   
 
       
 
R3b
R4
,
1 ,
pL L L
Q
H pH H H H L pL L L L
Q
c b D g u dud
p c s D s Qu p c s D s Qu g u dud
 
   
 
 
         
 


 
The first-order derivative of model M4 is: 
     
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
M4
R1
R2 R3a
R3b R4
/ 1 ,
1 , ,
, 1
l H L
Q
H L L pL
Q Q
H H L
Q Q
E Q Q c b u b u g u dud
b u s u g u dud p c u g u dud
s u g u dud s u s u g u du
   
     
   
             
         
      

 
   
Evaluating the first-order derivative at Q = QM2
*
 and substituting the above expression 
for cl provides: 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
*
M2
*
M2
*
M2
M4
R1
R2
/ ,
1
,
0
H pH H
Q Q
Q L pL L
H pH H
Q
p c b u
E Q Q g u dud
p c b u
p c b u g u dud

 

  

  
       
    
 
   
 


   
because pH – cpH – bH > 0 and pL – cpL – bL > 0. This implies that QM4
*
 is less than QM2
*
. 
iii) The first-stage objective function for models M5 and M7 can be written as: 
   M5
R1( ) ... R4( )
( , , ) ,l
Q Q
E Q c Q PA Q u g u dud  
 
       , 
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and    M7
R1( ) ... R6( )
( , , ) ,l
Q Q
E Q c Q PA Q u g u dud  
 
       .  
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.13 i), for the purpose of comparison, we allow for 
the winemaker to sell (salvage) fruits in model M5. Therefore, with the ability to sell 
excess fruit in the open market, the winemaker sets the profit maximizing price, pH = 
pH(TSH) and sells TSH amount of high-end wine. The first-derivative of the first-stage 
objective function then can be written as: 
 
    
   
 
    
 
 
      
    
'
M5
R1( )
'
R2( )
R3( )
R4( )
/ ,
1
,
1
1 ,
1 ,
H H pH
l
Q L pL
H H pH
Q L
H L pL
Q
H L
Q
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
E Q Q c g u dud
p c u
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
g u dud
s u
s u p c u g u dud
s u s u g u dud
   
 

   
 

   
   
   
         
    
   
  
   
   
  




 
As the production threshold is TSH in model M5, the bounds on regions R3(Q) and R4(Q) 
are equivalent to the bounds on regions R5(Q) and R6(Q) in model M7. Furthermore, due 
to continuity of the model, it is possible to split regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) in model M5 
into four separate regions with bounds that correspond to regions R1(Q), R2(Q), R3(Q) 
and R4(Q) of  M7. Therefore we can re-write the first-derivative of the M5 objective 
function as:  
 97 
 
    
   
 
    
 
 
      
    
M5
'
R1( ) R3( )
'
R2( ) R4( )
R5( )
R6( )
/
,
1
,
1
1 ,
1 ,
l
H H pH
Q Q L pL
H H pH
Q Q L
H L pL
Q
H L
Q
E Q Q c
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
g u dud
p c u
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
g u dud
s u
s u p c u g u dud
s u s u g u dud
   
 

   
 

   
   


      
   
  
    
   
  
   
   
  




 
and,  
      
    
    
   
 
    
 
 
    
M7
R1( )
R2( )
'
R3( )
'
R4( )
/ 1 ,
1 ,
,
1
,
1
1 ,
l H L
Q
H L
Q
H H pH
Q L pL
H H pH
Q L
H L
E Q Q c b u b u g u dud
b u s u g u dud
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
g u dud
p c u
p Qu Qu p Qu c u
g u dud
s u
s u b u g u d
   
   
   
 

   
 

  
         
  
   
  
    
   
  
   
  




    
R5( )
R6( )
1 ,
Q
H L
Q
ud
s u s u g u dud

     


 
To see the relationship between models M5 and M7, we evaluate the first-derivative of 
the objective function in model M7 at the optimal Q for model M5. Let QM5
*
 be the value 
of Q that maximizes the expected profit in model M5, i.e.  M5 /E Q Q     = 0.  
 98 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
    
*
M5 *
M5
*
M5
'
M7
R1( )
'
R2( )
/ ,
1
,
1 ,
H
H
H pH
Q Q
Q
L L pL
H
H
H pHQ
L L pL
p Qu Qu
b u
p Qu cE Q Q g u dud
b p c u
p Qu Qu
b u g u dud
p Qu c
b p c u g u
 

  

 
  



   
                 
 
       
    
            
    
 


 
*
M5R5( )Q
dud 
 
As, pH′(Quα) + pH(Quα) ˗ cpH ≥ pH(TSH) – cpH > bH and pL – cpL > bL, the first-derivative 
of the objective function in model M7 evaluated at Q = QM5
* 
is negative, i.e. 
 
*
M5
M7 /
Q Q
E Q Q

     < 0. Therefore, at optimal vineyard lease in model M5, the 
objective function of model M7 is decreasing. Due to the concavity of model M7, the 
optimal solution for model M7 must have already been reached, and thus QM5
*
< QM7
*
. 
iv) The proof is similar to the one presented in part ii) when models M2 and M4 are 
compared. First, observe that when the firm can sell its excess fruit, TPH of model M6 
becomes equivalent to TSH of model M8. Second, the downward substitution thresholds 
become equivalent in models M6 and M8 when pL – cpL – bL = 0, i.e, TPH
D
 = TPH
DT
.  
The optimal second-stage quantity decisions for model M6 are:  
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 
   
 
   
* * * *
* * *
,0,0,0,
                                               if , R1
1 ,0,0
,0,0,0,
                                    if , R2
,0, 1
, , , ,
, ,
L L
IH BH SH
IL BL SL
Qu
u Q
Qu
Qu
u Q
D Qu D
Qu
q q w q
q q q






 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
,0,0,0,
                                               if , R3
1 ,0,0
,0, ,0,
                                if , R3
1 ,0,0
,0,0,0,
          
,0, 1
DT DT
H H
L L
u a Q
Qu
TP Qu TP
u b Q
Qu
Qu
D Qu D








 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
                         if , R4
,0, 1 ,0,
                      if , R5
1 ,0,0
,0, 1 , ,
      if , R5
1 ,0,0
,0,0, ,
1 ,0, 1
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The only difference in the expected profit expressions of models M8 and M6 are in 
regions R1(Q) and R2(Q). The first-stage objective function for model M6 is: 
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The difference in the first-order derivatives for models M8 and M6, evaluated at QM6
*
 is: 
   
 
 
 
   
* *
M6 M6
M8 M6
'
R1 R 2
, 0
Q Q Q Q
H H
Q Q H
E Q E Q
Q Q
b p Qu Qu
u g u dud
p Qu
 
  

 

          
 
  
  
    

 
 101 
Therefore, QM8
*
< QM6
*
.  
Proof of Proposition 2.14: The optimal second-stage decisions in model M7 can be 
classified in the following regions: 
R1(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R2(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα ≤ TBH and Qu(1 – α)  DL} 
R3(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R4(Q) = {(u, α) : TBH < Quα ≤ TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}  
R5(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α) < DL} 
R6(Q) = {(u, α) : Quα > TSH and Qu(1 – α)  DL}. 
It must be noted that the price-setting flexibility is only available for the high-end 
segment, and the expected revenue from the low-end segment remains the same for both 
models. Thus, for the purposes of simplification, the low-end revenue function can be 
omitted from this proof.   
a) Let pH = pH(TBH) and therefore DH = TBH. It is possible to rewrite the first-stage 
objective function of model M3 as:  
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And the first-stage objective function of model M7 can be written as:  
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Because the demand in model M3 is DH = TBH of model M7, the firm buys additional 
fruit in regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) in both models. In regions R3(Q) and R4(Q), the return 
from the high-end segment in model M3 is (pH(TBH) ˗ cpH ˗ sH) TBH + sHQuα, whereas in 
model M7, the return in the high-end segment is (pH(Quα) ˗ cpH)Quα. Lastly, optimal 
second-stage decisions and the corresponding returns are equal in regions R5(Q) and 
R6(Q) in both models.  Therefore, let ΛM7-M3 be the difference between the expected 
returns in models M7 and M3, i.e. ΛM7-M3 = E[ΠM7(Q)] ˗ E[ΠM3(Q)], where: 
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Taking the first-order derivative of ΛM7-M3 w.r.t. Q provides: 
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.  
From Proposition 2.5, it is possible to show that the first-order condition ∂Π(q)/ ∂q = 
pH
′
(q)q + pH(q) – cpH  – sH = 0, yields the production threshold TSH. Therefore as pH
′
(Quα) 
< 0,  and in region R3(Q) and R4(Q) where Quα ≤ TSH, it is clear that pH
′
(Quα)Quα + 
pH(Quα) – cpH  – sH ≥ 0. As a result, the first-order derivate of ΛM7-M3 must be positive, 
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i.e.    M7 M3 /E Q E Q Q             ≥ 0. This implies that 
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≥ 0. Therefore, QM7
*
 is greater than QM3
*
.  
b) Let pH = pH(TSH) and therefore DH = TSH. It is possible to rewrite the first-stage 
objective function of model M3 as:  
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The proof is similar to the one presented for part a). Let us compare the optimal second-
stage decisions in both models. Because the demand in model M3 is DH = TSH of model 
M7, the firm buys additional fruit in regions R1(Q), R2(Q), R3(Q) and R4(Q) in model 
M3, but purchases additional fruit only in regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) in model M7. In 
regions R1(Q) and R2(Q) of model M3, the return in the high-end segment is (pH(TSH) ˗ 
cpH ˗ bH) TSH + bHQuα, whereas in model M7, the return in the high-end segment is 
(pH(TBH) ˗ cpH ˗ bH) TBH + bHQuα. In regions R3(Q) and R4(Q), the return from the high-
end segment in model M3 is (pH(TSH) ˗ cpH ˗ bH) TSH + bHQuα, whereas in model M7, the 
return in the high-end segment is (pH(Quα) ˗ cpH)Quα. Lastly, the optimal second-stage 
decisions and the corresponding returns are equal in regions R5(Q) and R6(Q) in both 
models. Therefore, let ΛM7-M3 be the difference between the expected returns in models 
M7 and M3, i.e. ΛM7-M3 = E[ΠM7(Q)] ˗ E[ΠM3(Q)], where: 
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Taking the first-order derivative of ΛM7-M3 w.r.t. Q provides: 
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From Proposition 2.5, it is possible to show that the first order condition ∂Π(q)/ ∂q = 
pH
′
(q)q + pH(q) – cpH  – bH = 0, yields the production threshold TBH. Therefore as 
pH
′
(Quα) < 0 and in region R3(Q) and R4(Q) where Quα > TBH, it is clear that 
pH
′
(Quα)Quα + pH(Quα) – cpH  – bH < 0. As a result, the first-order derivate of ΛM7-M3 
must be negative, i.e.    M7 M3 /E Q E Q Q             < 0. This implies that 
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< 0. Therefore, QM7
*
 is smaller than QM3
*
.  
c) For the purposes of a fair comparison, let pH = pH(TPH) and therefore DH = TPH, and 
the first-stage objective function for model M1 can be written as follows: 
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Next, we consider the first-stage objective function of model M5, which can be expressed 
as follows: 
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Let ΛM5-M1 be the difference between the expected returns in models M5 and M1, i.e. 
ΛM5-M1 = E[ΠM5(Q)] ˗ E[ΠM1(Q)], where: 
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Assuming demand in the high-end segment is linear, let DH = aH  ˗ βHpH. The winemaker 
can set a profit maximizing price in the high-end segment as pH = (aH  + βHcpH)/2βH, 
while setting a production target TPH = (aH  ˗ βHcpH)/2. When high-quality crop 
realization is below the production target, i.e. Quα < TPH, the firm sets the market-
clearing price pH(Quα) = (aH  ˗ Quα)/βH.  
Rewriting ΛM5-M1 with linear demand gives: 
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Taking the first-order derivative of ΛM5-M1 w.r.t. Q provides: 
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  
   
  
  
   
  



 
As, TPH = (aH  ˗ βHcpH)/2, it is possible to rewrite the first-order derivate of ΛM5-M1 w.r.t. 
Q as follows: 
   
   
M5 M1
R1 R2
2 ,H
Q Q
TP Qu u g u dud
Q
   


    
 
From the above expression, it is possible to show that the first-order derivate of ΛM5-M1 is 
negative when Quα > TPH/2. Furthermore with a uniformly distributed g(u,α), it is 
possible to see that uα has a higher value when Quα > TPH/2 than when Quα < TPH/2. As 
a result, │TPH ˗ 2Quα│is higher when Quα > TPH/2, resulting in the first-order derivate 
of ΛM5-M1 to be negative, i.e.    M5 M1 /E Q E Q Q             < 0. This implies that 
   
* *
M1 M1
M5 M1
Q Q Q Q
E Q E Q
Q Q 
         
 
<0. Therefore, QM5
*
 is smaller than QM1
*
.  
Proof of Proposition 2.15: The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 2.2 except 
that high-end demand and processing cost is replaced with low-end demand and 
processing cost.  
Proof of Proposition 2.16: The result follows from the fact that the market-clearing price 
in in the low-end segment, denoted pL(Qu(1 – α)) > pL
*
 when Qu(1 – α) ≤ TPL, and thus, 
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pL(Qu(1 – α)) – cpL ≥ pL
*
 – cpL, which leads to the fact that the threshold for downward 
substitution TPH
D
 (for a given Q) in model M10 to be smaller than that of M6. Because 
the upper threshold for downward substitution remains to be the same TPH point in both 
models, downward substitution occurs in a larger interval of Quα values in model M10. 
For the same pdf, this implies that P(w
*
 > 0) is greater than or equal to that of model M6.  
Proof of Proposition 2.17:  
The proof follows from Proposition 2.10 by replacing the downward substitution with the 
no fruit trading region. We omit the details.  
Notes on correlation analysis: 
For our numerical analysis, we will want to change the variance of α|u without changing 
the variance of u. Random variables u and z are independent with mean normalized to 
0.5, i.e., E[u] = E[z] = 0.5. However, we allow 2 2
u z  . Let  τ=
Z
u


and define    
      
(1 )u z      
Due to independence, we have [ ] 0.25E uz  (follows from   u ZE u z    = 0). 
Note that  
[ (1 ) ] 0.5E u z       
 =    
1/2 1/2
2 22 2 2 21 1u Z u                   
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       
   2 2
0.5 1 0.25
1 0.25
u u
u
E u E u u
E u E uz
       
  
            
      
. Thus, 
 
1/2
22 1
u
u
u



 

    
 
  
 
. Assuming that the correlation is nonnegative (i.e., 
u  0, γ  0), solving the above equation for γ yields 
 
   
1/2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
1
1 1 1
u u u
u
u u u
  

  
     

   
  
  
   
.  The mean and variance of α 
given realization u are: 
   1 1 0.5E u u u              and    
2 22 21 1Z uVar u            .  
Notes on deterministic quality and supply: 
For the problem variant with deterministic supply and quality, we assume the firm 
converts all of its fruit crop into the final product, i.e., qIH = Qu and qIL =  1Qu  . 
The first-stage objective function, denoted  Q , can be expressed as follows:     
         1l H pH L pLQ c Q p Qu c Qu p c Qu          . 
Remark B1. a) The optimal amount of farm space to be leased, denoted by Q
0
, under 
deterministic supply and quality satisfies 
 
         
20 0 0' 1H H l pH L pLp Q u u p Q u Q u c c u p c u           ; (2.10) 
b) the optimal deterministic profit, denoted by 
0( )Q , is  
     
2
0 0 0'HQ p Q u Q u    , (2.11)  
We next analyze the firm’s objective function under supply and  uality uncertainty:  
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        
     
,
1 ,
h h
l l
h h
l l
u
l pH H
u
u
L pL
u
E Q c c E u Q p Qu Qu g u d du
p c Qu g u d du




    
  
      
  
 
 
 
      ( ) ,
h h
l l
u
H H
u
Q p Qu p Qu Qu g u d du


            (2.12) 
Proposition B1. a) The first-stage objective function  in (2.12) is concave in Q, and the 
optimal amount of farm space to be leased satisfies 
 
   
 
 
   2
,
1'
h h
l l
u
l pHH
u L pLH
c c E up Qu u
g u d du
p c E up Qu Q u


 
 
 
  
  
          
  ; (2.13) 
b) the optimal profit is  
   * * * 2'( )( ) ,
h h
l l
u
H
u
E Q p Q u Q u g u dud


      
    , (2.14) 
and is less than its deterministic equivalent;  
Proof of Proposition B1: a) Expected profit is concave in Q because the demand 
function is concave, i.e.,  
          
2 32 2/ 2 '' , 0
h h
l l
u
H H
u
E Q Q p Qu u p Qu Q u g u d du


                  
and thus the first-order condition 
 
      
       
2
1
' ,
0
h h
l l
l pH L pL
u
H H
u
E Q
c c E u p c E u
Q
p Qu u p Qu Q u g u d du


 
     
           
  
 

 
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b) From the first-order condition, we have 
          
     
*
2* *
, 1
' ,
h h
l l
h h
l l
u
H l pH L pL
u
u
H
u
p Q u u g u d du c c E u p c E u
p Q u Q u g u d du




     
   
      

 
 
 
Substituting this expression in (2.12) provides (2.14). From the fact that pH(Quα)Quα is 
concave in u and α, it follows from Jensen’s ine uality that 
 
 ( )Q E Q      =    [ ( )] ,
h h
l l
u
H H
u
p Qu p Qu Qu g u d du


      =
   ( )H Hp Qu Qu E p Qu Qu    > 0, and thus (Q
0
) – E[(Q
*
)]  ( Q
*
) – 
E[(Q
*
)] > 0.  
The above proposition provides general results regarding the behavior of the optimal 
amount of farm space to be leased and the optimal profit expression under deterministic 
and stochastic supply and quality. Because the demand function is not described by a 
specific function, a closed-form expression is not provided for the optimal decisions; 
however, one can provide them for specific demand functions. The following analysis 
shows the optimal amount of farm space to be leased and the optimal profit of the firm 
under deterministic and stochastic supply and quality using linear demand, i.e., DH(pH) = 
aH – βHpH.  
Remark B2. a) The optimal amount of farm space to be leased under deterministic 
supply and quality is 
       
0
/ 1 /
2
H H l pH L pLa c u c p c u u u
Q
u
    

     
  ; b) 
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The optimal deterministic profit is 
         
2
0 1 / 1 /
4
H H l pH L pLQ a c u c p c u u
b
          
 
. 
Proof of Remark B2: The deterministic objective function 
     
   
1
11
H
l pH L pL
H
L pLl
H H pH
H
a Qu
Q c Q c Qu p c Qu
p c uc
a c Qu Qu
u u

 


  
  
 
        
 
                      
  
is concave in Q because  
     11
2
L pLl
H H pH
H
p c uQ c
a c Qu u
Q u u

  
  
                        
 and 
 
 
2
2
2
2
0
H
Q
u
Q


 
  

. The first-order condition provides the deterministic optimal 
amount of farm space to be leased: 
       
0
/ 1 /
2
H H l pH L pLa c u c p c u u u
Q
u
    

     
  . Substituting the 
deterministic optimal amount of farm space to be leased back into the objective function 
leads to 
   11 L pLl
H H pH
H
p c uc
a c Qu Qu
u u

  
  
                     
.   
Proposition B2. Under stochastic supply and quality: a) The first-stage objective 
function is concave in Q, and the optimal amount of farm space to be leased is 
          
    
*
2
/ 1 /
2 1
H H l pH L pLa c E u c p c E u E u
Q
E u cv u
   
 
        

; b) The optimal 
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amount of farm space to be leased is less than that of the deterministic supply and 
quality, i.e., 
* 0Q Q ; c) The optimal profit is 
 
            
    
2
2
*
2
/ 1 /
4
H H l pH L pL
H
a c E u c p c E u E u E u
E Q
E u Var ua
    
 
          
 

, 
and is less than its deterministic equivalent; d) The optimal amount of farm space to be 
leased and the optimal profit are both decreasing in the variance of supply and quality 
uncertainty.  
Proof of Proposition B2:  
        
     
 
   
 
  22 2
,
1 ,
[ ]
1
h h
l l
h h
l l
u
l pH H
u
u
L pL
u
l
pH
H H
L pL
H
E Q c c E u Q p Qu Qu g u d du
p c Qu g u d du
c
c
E u
a Qu Q E u Var u
p c E u
E u




    
  

   



      
  
  
  
  
         
    

 
   
 
 
   
 
  2 22 [ ]
1
l
pH
H H
L pL
H
c
c
E u
a u Q E u Var u
p c E u
E uE Q
Q

   



  
  
  
         
         

,  
 
  
2
2 2
2
2
[ ] 0
H
E Q
E u Var u
Q
 

       

.  
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Therefore, the first-order condition, when equated to zero, provides the optimal amount 
of farm space to be leased:  
            
    
*
2
/ 1 /
2
H H l pH L pLa c E u c p c E u E u E u
Q
E u Var ua
    

        

 
b) Observe that the above optimal amount of farm space to be leased can also be 
expressed as:  
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
*
0
1
2
1
2
L pLl
H H pH
L pLl
H H pH
p c E uc
a c
E u E u
Q
Var ua
E u
E u
p c uc
a c u
u u
Q
u


 



 
 

         
    
 
  
 
   
    
     
 
c) Substituting 
*Q  back into the objective function provides 
 
 
   
 
 
2
2
*
2
1
[ ]
4 [ ] [ ]
L pLl
H H pH
H
p c E uc
a c E u
E u E u
E Q
E u Var u

 
 
  
         
      
  
 
Moreover, 
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 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
2
2
*
2
2
0
0
2 2
1
[ ]
4 [ ] [ ]
1
4 1 1
L pLl
H H pH
H
L pLl
H H pH
H
p c E uc
a c E u
E u E u
E Q
E u Var u
p c E uc
a c
E u E u Q
Q
cv u cv u

 
 
  


 
  
         
      
  
         
        
 
 
d) Because 
 
 
   
 
 
    
*
2 2
2
1
0
] 2
L pLl
H H pH
p c E uc
a c E u
E u E uQ
Var u E u Var u
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, the 
optimal amount of farm space to be leased and the optimal profit are monotonically 
decreasing in the variance term of supply and quality uncertainty.  
Denoting the coefficient of variation in supply uncertainty as 
     /cv u Var u E u   , the optimal amount of farm space to be leased can also be 
expressed as follows: 
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Therefore, the optimal amount of farm space to be leased is decreasing in coefficient of 
variation, and because we keep the mean fixed, it decreases in supply and quality 
variation under random supply and quality. Similarly, the optimal value of the objective 
function is decreasing in the coefficient of variation, 
 
 
  
 
0
* 0
2
1
Q
E Q Q
cv u

    
 

 
and is less than its deterministic equivalent.  
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CHAPTER 3: WINE FUTURES AND ADVANCE SELLING UNDER QUALITY UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Introduction 
This essay examines the use of advance selling as a form of operational flexibility 
to mitigate quality-rating risk in wine production. The motivation for this study stems 
from the desire of Heart and Hands Wine Company in upstate New York to allocate a 
portion of their popular Pinot Noir wine to be sold in advance as wine futures. The 
study is targeted to assist the rapid growth of the United States wine industry and help 
winemakers mitigate the risk in their revenue cash flows.  
Over the last decade, the number of wineries in the United States has more than 
doubled, from 2,688 in 1999 to over 6,000 in 2009.7 With the increasing popularity of 
California wines, some of the more established wineries in the Napa Valley region 
have been sold off to large international corporations that benefit from the economies 
of scale and superior spending power. On the other hand, many wineries in the United 
States are still privately-owned and operate as family businesses with limited 
financial resources. While these smaller boutique wineries have been successful in the 
production of high quality wines and establishing themselves  among wine 
enthusiasts as something of a ‘cult status’, they have also struggled financially due to 
high costs and uncertainties that are inherent to wine production.  
The production process of wine begins at harvest, where winemakers obtain 
grapes that vary in quality between each growing season. Once the grapes are sorted, 
pressed and fermented, the wine is aged in barrels for two years before it can be 
                                                 
7 Statistics provided by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau (TTB). 
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bottled and sold to the general public. During these two years, the winemakers bear the 
risks of having their equity tied up in inventory that fluctuates in value depending on the 
quality of the final product. Therefore, in recent times, to reduce the risk of having cash 
tied up as wine in barrels, many winemakers have begun adopting the traditional French 
‘en primeur’ system, where they set aside a large portion of their total wine production to 
be sold as ‘wine futures.’ 
In this study, we investigate the impact of quality rating uncertainty that the wine 
receives from external reviewers and tasting experts. Specifically, we examine the 
decision made by the winemaker who obtains two ratings for the wine: First for the 
barrel rating when the wine is in the early stage of its aging process, and a second bottle 
rating when the wine is bottled and is ready to be sold to consumers. We consider a 
winemaker who, at harvest, obtains a certain number of barrels of wine. After eight to ten 
months of barrel aging, outside journalists and independent reviewers are invited to the 
cellars to taste the wine while still in barrels. At this point the quality of the wine in the 
barrels is uncertain due to the varying quality of the grapes that the winemaker can obtain 
each year.  
The most influential reviewer is Robert Parker Jr. of The Wine Advocate, and his 
rating is often seen as the industry benchmark. The potential barrel score out of 100 that 
he gives to the wine would usually determine whether the wine would be a success or a 
failure.  The review by Parker marks the beginning of ‘en primeur campaign’ for that 
vintage. At this point, the winemaker has to make an important decision in terms of the 
proportion of the total wine production that should be allocated to be sold as futures, and 
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the price they should charge for the wine futures. Wines with high reviews in the 
upper 90s are highly sought after by merchants, collectors and investors and can be 
sold at higher prices. Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of the barrel rating Robert Parker 
gives to wine on price of the wine futures. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The prices of 2010 Bordeaux futures and their corresponding ratings from 
Robert Parker.8 
 
At the end of the ‘en primeur campaign,’ the wine undergoes one more year of 
barrel aging before it is bottled and sent for blind tasting, where a bottle rating out of 
100 is assigned to the wine. Similar to barrel rating, the bottle rating plays a 
significant role in determining the final price of the wine. However, unlike wine 
futures, the demand for bottled wine tends to be higher as access to bottled wine is 
not only limited to the small numbers of merchants, collectors and enthusiasts. 
                                                 
8 Data obtained from Liv-Ex.com. Liv-Ex.com is a wine trading platform that facilitates merchants and 
collectors in wine and wine futures trading, and is similar to financial market such as the NASDAQ and the 
S&P 500.  
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Bottled wine can easily be made accessible to the general everyday consumers. During 
the first stage of the aging period, the barrel rating is completely unknown to the 
winemaker and consumers. However, at the beginning of the second stage of the aging, 
i.e., once the barrel rating is revealed, the winemaker and consumers can use barrel rating 
as an indication for the potential bottle rating. To capture the relationship and the nature 
of uncertainty between the two ratings, we model the barrel rating and bottle rating as 
two random variables, where the bottle rating is conditioned on the barrel rating. This 
conditional definition of bottle rating random variable eliminates the unrealistic scenario 
where a relatively good wine can turn into a very low quality wine, and vice versa. 
Advance selling provides certain advantages to the winemaker, but it also comes at a 
risk. Wine futures allow winemakers to pass on the quality rating risk to consumers and 
gain access to cash immediately. The negative consequence of selling wine in the form of 
futures is that the firm may lose the opportunity of higher revenues that can be obtained 
from retail sales. An example of this can be seen with one of the well-known Bordeaux 
‘Premier Crus’, 1996 Chateau Lafite Rotchschild. In 1997, while this wine was still aging 
in the barrel, Robert Parker gave it a barrel rating of 91 to 93, resulting in the opening 
price of $1,400 per case. A year after establishing the barrel score, Parker tasted the wine 
again and gave it a perfect bottle rating of 100. As a consequence of this perfect bottle 
rating score, the price of the wine rose to $3,700 per case, resulting in an approximately 
150% increase in price. In this example, selling its wine early as futures, Chateau Lafite 
Rotchschild has lost the opportunity of making higher profits based on its bottle rating.  
While the winemaker may benefit from the increase in the quality of the wine during 
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the aging process, there is also the opposite risk of allocating too much wine for 
distribution through traditional retail channels. This occurs when the wine does not 
up to the expectations, making the price at the end of the aging process lower than 
that of the futures price, resulting in a loss of future revenues.  
Wine futures also exhibit some positive opportunities for consumers, but they 
come along with risks. First, wine futures enable consumers to gain access to wine 
that is rare and highly sought after at a price that is often lower than the retail price. 
Second, when consumers purchase the wine as futures, they assume the risk of 
quality-rating uncertainty from winemaker; and thus, they may lose out if the wine 
does not live up to its potential. Moreover, due to the increase in the popularity of 
wine futures, many wine merchants and investors have taken advantage of this 
unregulated market by setting up false funds and illegal schemes that induced buyers 
into buying wine futures that they did not have access to. It was recently reported that 
a wine investment firm in the United Kingdom has defrauded a total of ₤2.5 million 
from investors and collectors who were seeking to get hold of rare Bordeaux wines.9   
Our study investigates optimal production allocation for a winemaker that faces 
quality rating uncertainty from two different perspectives: (1) A risk-neutral 
perspective where the winemaker seeks to maximize the expected profit, and (2) a 
risk-averse perspective where the winemaker seeks a balance between maximizing 
the expected profit and reducing the downside risk of a decrease in quality rating. 
In this study, we address the following research questions: 
                                                 
9 Decanter Magazine, “Wine investors ‘defrauded of ₤2.5m’” October 15th 2010.  
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1. How should a winemaker allocate and set the price of wine futures in order to 
maximize expected profit in the presence of the barrel and bottle ratings 
uncertainty? 
2. How does risk aversion influence the firm’s decisions regarding the allocation 
of wine to be sold as wine futures and the allocation for retail distribution?  
3. What is the impact of variation, and the relationship between the random barrel 
and bottle ratings, on the winemaker’s pricing and allocation decisions? 
It is important to highlight that the winemaker and wine futures consumers in our 
modeling approach differ from the traditional description of risk aversion of and risk 
neutrality commonly presented in the industrial organization theory of economics 
literature. In industrial organization theory, large corporations can diversify their risk, and 
therefore, do not need to take actions from a risk-averse perspective. According to the 
same theory, small firms and individual consumers have limited resources, such as cash, 
legal support, etc., and can take actions that exhibit risk aversion. In our model, however, 
we investigate a segment of consumers who are affluent and are not typical examples of 
consumers in the industrial organization theory. These consumers exhibit a greater 
attraction to fine wine and take actions that do not exhibit risk aversion, but represent the 
actions of risk-neutral consumers. As a result, the consumer segment in this study is 
defined as risk neutral. The winemaker, on the other hand, can exhibit behavior that 
represents a risk-averse decision maker. This is because, the winemaker has its cash tied 
up in the aging inventory, and is concerned about its cash position in the future. 
Therefore, our description of the winemaker considers a risk-averse decision maker.   
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In the next section, we review advance selling in economics, marketing and 
operations management literature, and demonstrate how our work differs from earlier 
publications. 
 
 3.2 Literature Review 
Advance selling is a common marketing practice in which sellers offer buyers 
with opportunities to purchase the goods or services before the time of consumption. 
In marketing, early literature in advance selling focuses on the use of advance selling 
as a tool to price discriminate and manage fluctuations in demand in the airline and 
leisure industry (Gale and Holmes, 1992). Gale and Holmes (1993) illustrate that 
firms facing demand uncertainty with limited capacity can expand their output by 
adopting advance selling to induce buyers to purchase early, and thus, reduce the 
demand risk at the time of consumption. This study is similar to Gale and Holmes 
(1993), as we show that the winemaker can mitigate the demand risk by adopting 
advance selling as a form of allocation flexibility. However, we depart from their 
study by introducing the uncertainty of bottle ratings, which in turn influences both 
the allocation decision of the winemaker and the consumer valuation of the wine.    
In addition to the above publications in marketing literature, recent studies in 
advance selling have focused on the conditions in which advance selling can be 
beneficial. Shugan and Xie (2000, 2005) and Xie and Shugan (2001), show that the 
conditions in which advance selling can be beneficial to the firms as a marketing tool 
are far more general than previously thought, and not limited to firms that operate 
under a capacity constraint. Specifically, they demonstrate that the use of advance 
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selling as an effective marketing tool does not require industry-specific characteristics but 
only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuation. Fay and Xie 
(2010) extend the marketing literature in this area. By comparing the use of advance 
selling and probabilistic selling, they derive conditions under which one dominates the 
other.  
While there is an abundance of marketing literature in the area of advance selling, 
few have studied the problem from an operations and supply chain management 
perspective. Su (2007), and Su and Zhang (2008, 2009), examine the situation where 
firms participate in multiple selling periods over a finite time. Although these studies do 
not consider the use of advance selling, they shed light into the area of strategic customer 
behavior, specifically the influence of forward looking and myopic buyers on the firm’s 
pricing and selling decisions. 
In the past, there have been many studies in economics and finance (e.g. Kohn 1978) 
that illustrate the effect of speculators in the resale market. In operations management 
literature, Su (2010) considers the problem where there are both speculators and genuine 
buyers in the market, and shows that firms can gain additional benefit by mimicking the 
action of the resellers in the resale market when consumer valuations are fixed over time. 
Our study departs from Su (2010) by allowing for the quality-rating to fluctuate between 
the two selling periods, and thus in turn influences the consumer valuation of the product 
during the two selling periods. In other words, we allow for exogenous factors to 
influence consumer valuation before the time of consumption. Tang and Lim (2011) 
extend the work in this field by examining the interrelationship between speculators and 
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forward-looking consumers. They develop conditions in which sellers can benefit 
from the existence of speculators in the market. Specifically, they show that when the 
expected valuation is decreasing over time, speculators can be beneficial in 
generating future demand.  
In recent times, there has been an emergence of research that considers the use of 
various operational flexibilities to mitigate demand uncertainty. Van Mieghem and 
Dada (1999), Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Dana and Petruzzi (2001), Federgruen and 
Heching (1999, 2002) and Kocabıyıkoğlu and Popescu (2011) show that firms can 
adopt production and pricing flexibilities to mitigate demand risk under deterministic 
supply. Furthermore, Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) demonstrate that, under 
postponed pricing, production postponement has little benefits to the manufacturer. 
Our essay departs from these studies as it features: (1) Quality-rating uncertainty, (2) 
the use of advance selling in addition to pricing flexibility that can be used to mitigate 
demand risk, and (3) a risk-averse firm that benefits from recuperating income in 
advance. Moreover, we show that advance pricing and advance allocation may be 
beneficial to firms that have significant amount of cash tied up in inventory that may 
diminish in value.  
In addition to the pricing flexibility, Jones et al. (2001) and Kazaz (2004) 
illustrate that firms can also mitigate demand uncertainty through utilizing a 
secondary source of supply. Our work differs from the studies as we examine the 
problem of managing demand uncertainty through the use of advance selling as a 
secondary market for consumers, instead of adopting a secondary source of supply in 
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the production process.  
In operations and supply chain management, quality uncertainty is often seen as 
uncertainty in the production process where multiple products with varying quality are 
produced simultaneously in a single production run. Bitran and Dasu (1992), Bitran and 
Gilbert (1994), Nahmias and Moinzadeh (1997), Bassok et al. (1999), Hsu and Bassok 
(1999), Tomlin and Wang (2008) and Noparumpa et al. (2011) all examine the firm’s 
downward substitution decisions under various settings. However in this study we 
examine quality uncertainty from a different perspective. We investigate a problem where 
the quality of wine can fluctuate during the course of the aging process; and hence this 
presents the winemaker with the opportunity to allocate a proportion of the total 
production to be sold as futures in advance, and thus, reducing the risk of the variation in 
quality in future periods. 
In sum, this essay integrates the two important disciplines of business, namely 
marketing and operations management, by studying the use of advance selling from two 
different perspectives.  From a marketing perspective, it shows that advance selling can 
act as a method to price discriminate buyers, and thus, enables the winemaker to extract 
additional surplus from the consumers. From an operations management perspective, in 
the presence of quality-rating uncertainty, advance selling allows the winemaker to pass 
on the risk of holding inventory that fluctuate in value due to quality-rating uncertainty to 
the end consumers, while recuperating the necessary cash that is required for 
reinvestment early in the production process.  
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3.3 Problem Definition and the Model 
This section presents the problem definition for a winemaker that experiences 
quality-rating uncertainty during the aging process. The problem is formulated as a 
stochastic program. At time t0, which corresponds to the end of the harvest season, 
the winemaker obtains the total number of barrels of wine to be produced for that 
vintage, denoted Q. At time t1, after eight to ten months of barrel aging, the 
winemaker invites experts such as Robert Parker Jr. to taste the wine, and a barrel 
rating is revealed to both the winemaker and consumers. At this point the winemaker 
has to decide on the quantity of wine to be sold as futures, denoted qf , which 
determines the corresponding price pf, while facing the bottle rating uncertainty. The 
remaining portion of wine that is not allocated for sales as futures, denoted with qr, is 
reserved for retail sales. At the end of the aging process, alternatively at time t2, the 
wine is bottled and sent for blind tasting. At this time, the bottle rating is revealed and 
the wine is sold at a retail price pr that responds to the fluctuations in the bottle rating. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the timeline of events that winemaker faces during the wine 
production process.  
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Figure 3.2. The timeline of events in a life of a winemaker. 
 
After the barrel rating is realized at time t1, the wine undergoes one more year of 
barrel aging. At the end of the aging process at time t2, the bottle rating of the wine is 
revealed. Similar to the barrel rating, the randomness in bottle rating is represented with a 
stochastic random variable
 s2
with realization denoted with s2 defined on a support [s2l(s1), 
s2h(s1)] that may depend on the value of barrel rating score s1. As the barrel rating s1 
provides indication to the final bottle rating s2, the random variable  s2
follows a 
conditional probability density function f(s2 | s1), where the expectation of the bottle score 
at the time t1 when the barrel rating is revealed, is identical to the barrel rating, i.e. E[ s2
| 
s1] = s1. 
In this study, we let the retail price be a price that responds to the uncertainty in the 
bottle rating. Without loss of generality, we normalize units such that the price of retail 
wine is equivalent to the bottle rating of the wine, i.e.,  pr = pr(s2) = s2. It follows that the 
expected price of retail at time t1 is equivalent to the barrel score, i.e. E[pr( s2
│s1)] = s1. 
We next introduce the modeling approach used to describe the winemaker’s demand 
for futures and retail sales. We develop a discrete choice model to describe demand for 
futures. The market size for wine futures is denoted by M. At time t1, the unit futures 
price pf is announced and each individual in the futures market assesses his/her utility of 
three choices: purchase at time t1 (i.e., a wine future), purchase at time t2 (i.e., retail 
purchase), do not purchase. The expected utilities of each choice are denoted as uf, ur, u0, 
respectively, and are defined as follows: 
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uf =  2 1| fE s s p  = s1 – pf 
ur =    2 1 2 1| |rE s s E p s s   = 0 
u0 = 0 
The value of   [0, 1] in the expression describing the utility from futures, i.e., uf, 
accounts for exogenous risk and time-value-of-money from purchasing a wine future at 
time t1 that has an uncertain value compared to the option of purchasing the final product 
with a known value at a later time t2. We see that the expected utility of a retail purchase 
is the difference between the expected value of the wine as reflected in the bottle and the 
expected retail price, which nets to zero. 
 Each individual in the futures market has idiosyncratic preferences that are captured 
by independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) Gumbel random variables with zero 
mean and scale parameter , i.e., the utilities of a random member of the market are:  
Uf = uf + f = s1 – pf + f, 
Ur = ur + r = r, and 
U0 = u0 + 0 = 0, 
which yield the multinomial logit model. Accordingly, the demand for futures is  
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.                     (3.1) 
The objective of the winemaker is to determine on the optimal quantity of wine 
that are to be sold as futures, denoted qf , and the corresponding optimal price pf  that 
maximizes expected profit while facing barrel rating and bottle rating uncertainties. In 
this study, we model the problem of uncertain valuation of future consumption by 
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adopting the risk-adjusted discount rate that is common among the finance literature (e.g., 
Samuelson 1963). The risk-adjusted discount rate, denoted with ϕ, enables us to model 
the winemaker preference of selling wine as retail that depends on the associated  
exposure to risk of holding back each additional bottle of wine to be sold as retail at time 
t2. Therefore to assess the return on risky asset such as wine, we adopt the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). CAPM provides a theoretical framework towards determining 
the expected return of the risky asset E[r] that is based on the risk-free rate of return rf, 
the market rate of return rm and the systematic risk γ, where    f m fE r r r r     is 
independent of the quantity of wine that are allocated towards sales as futures, qf. 
Therefore, without loss of generality, for the remaining part of this study we assume that 
the winemaker’s preference towards selling wine as retail ϕ depends on exogenous 
factors that are beyond the control of the winemaker. As a consequence of this 
assumption, we limit its value to be such that  0,1 . The winemaker’s objective 
function can then be written as: 
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  .         (3.2) 
The first term pfqf in the objective function equation (3.2) refers to the revenue gain 
from selling wine as futures, the second term ϕE[pr(s2│t1)](Q - qf) refers to the 
winemaker’s expected revenue from selling wine as retail adjusted according to the 
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winemaker’s preference.  
3.4 Analysis 
We begin our analysis with the structural properties of the objective function 
presented in (3.2). By demonstrating that there exists a unique optimal solution to the 
profit maximization problem, we follow a similar approach presented in Li and Huh 
(2011) in order to characterize the optimal decisions in closed-form expressions.  
We first express the price of wine futures pf as a function of the quantity of wine 
futures to be sold qf. From (3.1), pf(qf) can be expressed as follows: 
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(3.3) 
Therefore the objective function in  (3.2) can be written as a profit maximization 
problem in terms of a single decision variable qf: 
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.                                   
(3.4) 
Proposition 3.1. The objective function in (3.4) is concave in the quantity of wine to be 
sold as futures qf.  
By illustrating that the profit maximization problem is concave in the decision 
variable, we can therefore explore the unique property of the multinomial logit model 
that enables the optimal profits and the decision variables to be expressed in closed-
form expressions involving the Lambert W function (Corless et al. 1996) which for 
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any nonnegative z, W(z) is the solution w satisfying z = wz
w
.  
Proposition 3.2. In the standard multinomial logit model we can write the optimal profit 
ρ
*
, the optimal quantity of wine futures to be sold qf
*
 and the optimal selling price of wine 
futures pf
*
as: 
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* *
1 1f fp s s Q                                                    (3.7) 
From the above proposition, it is clear that the multinomial logit formulation allows 
us to characterize the optimal profit, optimal quantity allocation and optimal price of 
wine futures as closed-form expressions.  
Such a result enables us to develop insights into the factors that influence the 
winemaker optimal allocation and the optimal price of wine futures. Proposition 3.2 
demonstrates that the optimal price and quantity paths of wine futures are driven by four 
main factors: (1) the winemaker’s preference of selling wine as retail ϕ; (2) the consumer 
preference towards buying wine futures θ; (3) the quality score of wine in barrel s1; and 
(4) the degree of consumer heterogeneity in the market β. In the next section, we analyze 
the properties and the key driving forces behind the optimal allocation and pricing 
decisions.  
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3.4.1 Analysis of the optimal decision variables 
In this section, we analyze the influence of the winemaker’s preference of selling 
wine as retail ϕ, the consumer preference towards buying wine as futures θ, the barrel 
score of wine s1, and the degree of consumer heterogeneity in the market β.   
We begin our analysis by examining the case where the consumers are risk-
neutral and thus the value from the consumption of wine as futures is the same as 
consuming the wine as retail at the end of period t2. Therefore, the value of  is solely 
based on the risk-free rate of return, i.e. θ = (1+rf)
-1
. In such a case, the consumer 
preference towards the consumption of wine as futures is greater than the 
winemaker’s preference towards selling wine as retail, as θ > ϕ. 
Proposition 3.3. a) The optimal profit ρ
*
, the optimal quantity of wine futures to be sold 
qf
*
 and the optimal selling price of wine futures pf
*
 are increasing the barrel score s1 
when the consumer preference of purchasing wine as futures is higher than the 
winemaker preference from selling wine as retail, i.e. θ > ϕ. b) The optimal profit ρ
*
, the 
optimal quantity of wine futures to be sold qf
*
 and the optimal selling price of wine 
futures pf
*
 are increasing in the consumer preference of wine futures. 
From Proposition 3.3, it is possible to see that, due to the fact that the winemaker 
has a higher preference towards selling wine as fustures and that consumers are 
indifferent towards consuming wine as futures or retail, the winemaker can gain 
additional profit by charging a higher price for wine futures, while also increasing the 
quantity of futures sales. Such allocation decision is common in the French wine 
industry. For a good vintage, as many as 300 chateaux would participate in the futures 
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market, and winemakers would allocate nearly 90% of their total production towards 
sales as futures. For a bad vintage, however, the number of participating wineries in the 
the futures market can drop to less than 60 chateaux.
10 
 
In terms of pricing, our results clearly support the recent trend in Bordeaux futures 
pricing strategy. For the 2010 vintage which many wine experts regard as a very strong 
vintage, the futures price for Château Lafite Rothschild has been recorded as 30% higher 
than the much weaker 2011 vintage.11  
Next, we investigate the scenario when the consumer preference towards consuming 
wine as future is low, and they prefer to buy wine as retail, while the winemaker’s 
preference for selling wine as retail is high, i.e., θ < ϕ. 
Proposition 3.4. a) The optimal profit ρ
*
, and the optimal selling price of wine futures pf
*
 
are increasing in the barrel score s1, and the optimal quantity of wine futures to be sold 
qf
* 
is decreasing in the barrel score s1 when the consumer preference of purchasing wine 
as futures is lower than the winemaker’s preference from selling wine as retail, i.e. θ < ϕ. 
b) The optimal profit ρ
*
 , the optimal selling price of wine futures pf
*
 are increasing in the 
winemaker’s preference towards selling wine as retail, and the optimal quantity of wine 
futures to be sold qf
*
 is decreasing in  the winemaker’s preference towards selling wine 
as retail. 
In this scenario, both consumers and the winemaker prefer to buy and sell wine as 
retail, and therefore, the winemaker can only gain additional profit by increasing price of 
wine futures to offset the quantity of wine that are allocated for sales as futures. In 
                                                 
10 CNN, ‘Betting on Bordeaux wine futures’, May 1
st
, 2008. 
11 Wine Spectator, ‘Château Lafite Rothschild releases its 2011 price’, April 17
th
, 2012. 
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addition, it can be shown from Proposition 3.4(b) that the above effect increases when 
the value of the winemaker’s preference to sell wine as retail ϕ increases. It must be 
noted that this scenario is less realistic than the previous case, as it is less likely in the 
real world that both the winemaker and consumers to prefer being exposed to the risk 
of uncertain bottle score, and consequently, to the uncertain retail price of wine.  
However, it must be noted that in recent years, Chateau Latour, which many 
considered to be the best winery in the world, caused some controversy by adopting 
the pricing and quantity strategy that is similar to the above. For its 2009 vintage, 
which many wine experts argue that it is one of the best wines ever produced, 
Chateau Latour has decided to hold back its allocation of wine futures, and has priced 
its wine at a much higher price than its past vintages.12 As revealed later, the reason 
behind this peculiar pricing and allocation policy is that the Chateau has decided to 
permanently shut down its future ‘en primeur’ futures campaign, stating that its 
preference to sell wine through retail was due to the advantages from gaining control 
over the sales and distribution of wine13.  
As mentioned earlier, in a more realistic setting, consumers and the winemaker 
tend to exhibit a certain degree of preference toward the time value of money that 
lead to a higher allocation and consumption of wine futures. Therefore the remaining 
part of the analysis in this section concentrates on developing insights into the 
winemaker’s optimal pricing and allocation decisions based on the scenario where the 
consumer preference towards buying wine futures is greater than the winemaker’s 
                                                 
12 Liv-Ex.com, ‘Liv-ex interview with Robert Parker, part one: Bordeaux 2009’, March 16
th
, 2012. 
13 Wine Spectator, ‘Château Latour Abandons Futures System’, April 16
th
, 2012. 
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preference towards selling wine as retail, i.e. θ > ϕ.  
We next investigate the impact of consumer heterogeneity β on the optimal price of 
futures, the optimal amount of wine allocated for futures, and the corresponding optimal 
profit. According to the Gumbel distribution, β corresponds to the dispersion of consumer 
willingness to buy wine as futures. Therefore, smaller values of β reflect the situation in 
which consumers have a similar preference towards consuming wine as futures. As a 
result, their utilities of buying wine as futures are relatively close to the mean. On the 
other hand, larger values of β correspond to the case where consumers are less 
homogenous towards their willingness to consume wine as futures. As a result, a 
proportion of consumers gain an extremely high utility from buying wine as futures 
relative to the mean, and some consumers gain a significantly lower utility relative to the 
mean.  
Proposition 3.5. When the consumer preference of purchasing wine as futures is higher 
than the winemaker’s preference from selling wine as retail, i.e. θ > ϕ, (a) The optimal 
profit ρ
 *
 and the optimal selling price of wine futures pf
*
 are initially decreasing with 
increasing values of the dispersion factor β, then they exhibit an increasing behavior in 
the dispersion factor β. The optimal quantity of wine futures to be sold qf
* 
monotonically 
decreases in the dispersion factor β; and (b) The winemaker’s optimal pricing policy for 
its wine futures can be classified in the following three regions:  
Region pf
* 
qf
* 
ρ
* 
β 
I Decrease decrease decrease β ≤ βpf
* 
II Increase decrease decrease  βpf
*
< β ≤ βρ
* 
III Increase decrease increase βρ
* 
> β 
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Figure 3.3. Impact of consumer heterogeneity on price of wine futures. 
 
Proposition 3.5 establishes two thresholds βpf
*
  and βρ
*
, that characterize the 
optimal allocation and pricing decisions for the winemaker who experiences different 
degrees of consumer heterogeneity β. βpf
*
  and βρ
*
 correspond to the degree of 
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consumer heterogeneity β that satisfy the first-order conditions of ∂pf
*
/∂β = 0 and ∂ρ
*
/∂β 
= 0, respectively.  
From Proposition 3.5 and Figure 3.3, it is possible to see that in region I, when all 
consumers are homogenous β = 0, the winemaker allocates their entire production to be 
sold as futures, i.e. qf
*
 = Q, and sets a price that clears the market. As the heterogeneity 
among consumers of wine futures increases, the winemaker decreases the price and the 
allocation of wine futures, resulting in a lower profit. This case reflects the scenario 
where some consumers that have lower willingness to pay for wine futures and find wine 
futures less attractive. As a result, the winemaker decreases the price of wine futures and 
the allocation of wine futures in order to compensate for the  reduced valuations, on 
average, that the consumers have for wine. Such actions result in the reduction of the 
winemaker’s profit.  
In region II, the heterogeneity among consumers is higher than in region I but not 
large enough for the winemaker to take full advantage of consumers with a higher 
willingness to pay. As a result, the winemaker increases the price of wine futures, but the 
increase is not significant enough to cover the loss of consumers with a lower willingness 
to pay. This result is reflected in the decreasing profit for the winemaker.   
In region III where the consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently high and is above the 
threshold βρ
*
, the winemaker takes advantage of consumers that have a very high 
willingness to pay for wine futures by charging a higher price for its wine futures while 
decreasing the wine futures allocation. In this scenario, the heterogeneity of consumers is 
sufficiently high, such that the increase in price of wine futures charged by the 
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winemaker offsets the loss in demand, and thus increases the overall profit of the 
winemaker.  
3.5 Conclusions  
The essay examines the implementation of advance selling in the wine industry as a 
form of operational flexibility in order to mitigate quality rating risk. We investigate the 
impact of various exogenous factors that influence the winemakers’ allocation between 
futures and retail sales, and its pricing decisions. The essay provides a comprehensive 
analysis that demonstrates the benefits of advance selling.  
The study makes three sets of main contributions. First, we develop an analytical 
model that investigates the implementation of advance selling in the wine industry. The 
modeling framework incorporates two forms of uncertainties: (1) Uncertain consumer 
valuations of wine futures and bottle wine, and (2) the bottle rating that is assigned to the 
wine at the end of the production process. We derive closed-form expressions for the 
optimal allocation and pricing decisions. These closed-form expressions enable us to 
investigate the underlying factors that influence the winemaker’s decisions.  
Second, our results provide insights into how barrel rating, consumer preference and 
the winemaker’s preference influence the winemaker’s allocation and pricing decisions. 
It is common for the winemaker to increase the price of wine futures, while placing a 
higher priority on sales of wine futures when the barrel rating score is high. In this 
scenario, the winemaker benefits from a higher profitability to recuperate the investment 
made early. However, we also demonstrate that in a scenario where the winemaker’s 
preference for selling wine as future is low, the firm places more emphasis on factors 
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such as control of distribution, and is less concerned about its cash position. In this 
scenario, the winemaker choses to lower its allocation of wine futures, and increases the 
price of futures.  
Our third contribution relates to the impact of consumer heterogeneity on the optimal 
allocation and pricing decision. Contrary to the common belief that the winemaker may 
be better off when consumers are more homogenous, our results demonstrate that the 
winemaker can achieve a higher level of profitability when the market is filled with 
consumers that are heterogeneous. As the consumers with the lower willingness find 
wine futures less attractive, the winemaker can charge a higher price for its wine futures 
and take advantage of the consumers whose valuations of wine futures are high. Such 
circumstance reflects the state of the world economy today. For example, despite the  
economic crises in Europe and the United States, and the emergence of the Asian 
economy exemplifies a stable global wine futures market. In this recent economic 
environment, the winemaker prefers to set a higher price for its wine futures in order to 
take advantage of the increasing affluence in the Asian market. Moreover, the winemaker 
also allocates more wine for retail sales with the hope that the traditional economic 
powerhouses would recover from the economic crises, and its consumers reenter the 
market at the retail stage.  
3.6 Future Research Directions 
In this essay, we have investigated the use of wine futures as a form of operations 
management tool that assists winemaker that is facing quality-rating risk. The current 
model assumes that the winemaker has the ability to set the price of wine futures but does 
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not have the ability to set the retail price pr once the bottle rating is revealed. This 
assumption resembles the traditional French ‘en primeur’ system where wine futures are 
traded on an established trading platform such as Liv-ex.com, resulting in the price of 
wine to be dictated by the quality of the bottled wine. United States, on the other hand, 
does not have an established market for wine futures, and this may allow winemakers to 
set their own prices for their retail wines. 
Similar to other commodities and financial instruments that are commonly traded, 
investors are actively participating in the market for wine. In the present model, we 
exclude the role of wine buyers, who view wine as a form of investment. Incorporating 
speculators into the futures market of the model can provide the opportunity to 
investigate the impact of the speculative purchase behavior prior to bottling. Specifically, 
wine investors may prefer to purchase wine that has a lower barrel rating, and thus 
inflating the demand for wine futures. On the other hand, the role of speculators may also 
damage the winemaker profitability as they may take away the proportion of consumers 
who prefer to purchase wine at retail.  
Lastly, in this essay, we have investigated the use of wine futures as a possible 
operations management tool in mitigating quality-rating risk. However, in reality, wine 
futures may also affect the winemaker’s decisions from a marketing perspective. First, 
wineries may adopt wine futures as an effective marketing tool. With successful sales of 
wine futures, wineries may experience an increase in demand for retail wine due to the 
‘hype’ that can be created from advance selling. On the other hand, by allocating too 
much wine to be sold as futures, wineries may lose certain degree of control over their 
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distribution channels. Therefore, one possible feature that may be included into this 
model is the costs and benefits of adopting wine futures from a marketing standpoint. 
 
3.7 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Taking the natural log of (3.1) and rearranging: 
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Optimal quantity is: 
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Proof of Proposition 3.3(a). Taking the first derivative of (3.5) with respect to s1: 
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From the above expression, it can be clearly seen that the optimal profit ρ
*
 is increasing 
in the barrel score s1, when (θ - ϕ) > 0.  
 The optimal profit expression can be written as 
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In addition, from (3.7) we can show that: 
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Proof of Proposition 3.3(b). Taking the first derivative of (3.5) with respect to θ 
provides the following result: 
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Taking the first derivative of qf
*
 with respect to θ provides: 
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Taking the first derivative of (3.6) with respect to θ provides the result: 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4(a). Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3, we take the first 
derivative of  (3.5) with respect to s1:  
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From the definition of the Lambert Function, ( ) / ( ) / (1 ( ))dW z dz W z z W z  , the above 
expression can be written as follows: 
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As ρ
*
 is an increasing function of Q, we evaluate ∂ρ
*
/∂s1 at the smallest value of Q that 
corresponds to Q = qf. 
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Therefore as ∂ρ
*
/∂s1 is positive at the smallest value of Q, ∂ρ
*
/∂s1 is always positive.  
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Proof of Proposition 3.4(b). Taking the first-order derivative of (3.5) with respect to ϕ 
provides: 
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As ρ
*
 is an increasing function of Q, we evaluate ∂ρ
*
/∂ϕ at the smallest value of Q that 
corresponds to Q = qf. 
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Therefore, as ∂ρ
*
/∂ϕ is equal to 0 at the smallest value of Q, ∂ρ
*
/∂ϕ is always positive.  
Taking the first-order derivative of qf
*
 with respect to ϕ: 
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Taking the first derivative of (3.7) with respect to ϕ provides: 
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As ∂ρ
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/∂ϕ > 0  and Q is less than 1, it is clear that ∂pf
*
/∂ϕ > 0 .  
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Taking the first- and second-order derivatives of (3.5) with 
respect to β provides: 
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Taking the first- and second-order derivatives of (3.7) with respect to β provides:
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation investigates the use of operational flexibilities in production 
planning under supply and quality uncertainty that are commonly experienced among 
agro-businesses, and in particular, in the wine industry. In this dissertation, we have 
developed analytical models that provide prescriptive policies and insights for a 
winemaker regarding how it can manage risks associated with supply and quality 
uncertainty.  
The first essay investigates the problem where the winemaker receives an uncertain 
amount of high- and low-quality grapes, due to varying growing conditions such as 
adverse weather conditions, diseases and natural disasters. The study examines the 
interactions between the three forms of operational flexibility available to agricultural 
firms in mitigating supply and quality uncertainty. These flexibilities are: (1) Downward 
substitution, where high-quality fruit can be used in the making of a low-end product, (2) 
price-setting, where the firm can influence the demand of the high-end product by 
appropriately selecting the selling price in the high-end segment (in which consumers 
exhibit smaller price elasticity); and (3) fruit-trading flexibility, where the firm can 
purchase additional fruit in the event of lower supply realizations, or sell some of its 
excess fruit in the open market for revenue. The essay provides a comprehensive analysis 
that demonstrates the interrelationships between these three forms of operational 
flexibilities.  
An important finding of this study reveals a surprising result for the relationship 
between the price-setting and the downward substitution flexibilities. It is commonly 
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argued that price-setting and downward substitution flexibilities are two substitutable 
tools that negatively impact each other’s utilization. Contrary to this notion, we prove 
that price-setting and downward substitution flexibilities play a complementary role to 
each other. Pricing flexibility allows the winemaker to adopt downward substitution 
flexibility more frequently, resulting in a higher expected amount and a higher 
probability of downward substitution.  
In addition to demonstrating that downward substitution flexibility is most beneficial 
in the presence of price-setting flexibility, this essay also shows how variations in supply 
and  uality influence the winemaker’s decisions. Specifically, significant variations in 
quality and limited variation in supply make downward substitution more attractive, 
reducing the need for the winemaker to rely heavily on a vineyard lease.  
The second essay examines the implementation of advance selling in the wine 
industry as a form of operational flexibility. This essay provides insights into how barrel 
rating, consumers’ preference and the winemaker’s preference influence the winemaker’s 
allocation and pricing decisions. This essay shows that, while it is typically more 
common and beneficial for the winemaker to increase the price of wine futures when the 
barrel rating is high, in a scenario where the winemaker’s preference for selling wine as 
future is low, it would be more beneficial for the winemaker to lower the allocation of 
wine futures and increase the price of futures to offset the lower quantity.  
Contrary to the common belief that the winemaker is better off when consumers are 
more homogenous, our results demonstrate that the winemaker can achieve a higher level 
of profitability when the market is filled with consumers that are heterogeneous. As the 
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consumers with a lower willingness to pay leave the market, the winemaker can charge a 
higher price for the wine futures and take advantage of the consumers whose valuations 
of wine future are high.  
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